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Abstract
We advocate an account of dualities between physical theories: the basic idea is that
dual theories are isomorphic representations of a common core. We defend and illustrate
this account, which we call a Schema, in relation to symmetries.
Overall, the account meshes well with standard treatments of symmetries. But the
distinction between the common core and the dual theories prompts a distinction between
three kinds of symmetry: which we call ‘stipulated’, ‘accidental’ and ‘proper’.
1Forthcoming in Synthese, in a special issue on ‘Symmetries and Asymmetries in Physics’ edited by
M. Frisch, R. Dardashti, and G. Valente.
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2
1 Introduction
Symmetries have long been a central topic in the philosophy of physics: as witness collec-
tions such as Brading and Castellani (2003) and this special issue. But dualities between
physical theories have only more recently become a focus of interest.2 In this paper we
bring the topics together, by applying an account of dualities that we have developed
elsewhere.
Bringing the topics together is natural. For in the literature, it is agreed by all hands
that a duality is like a “giant symmetry”: a symmetry between theories. For in physics, the
basic idea of a symmetry is a map taking a state of the system into another appropriately
related state; and correspondingly mapping physical quantities—details below. And in a
duality, an entire theory is mapped into another appropriately related theory.
Our account of dualities will confirm this basic analogy. The leading idea will be: (i)
the preservation, or appropriate matching, of a state’s values for various quantities, and
(ii) this preservation or matching being maintained by the dynamics of the system. (We
say ‘preservation or matching’ so as to respect the distinction between invariance and
covariance, and ‘dynamics’ is to include Euclidean systems: details below.)
In short: our account—we call it a ‘Schema’—holds that a duality between two theories
requires that:
(a): the two theories share a common core; the common core is itself a theory,
which we will call the bare theory; (for us, a bare theory or model is a theory or model
stripped of its interpretation; more details in Section 2.1); and
(b): the two given theories are isomorphic models of this common core, the bare
theory.
Here, we understand ‘models’ as realizations or formulations. They are almost always
representations in the sense of representation theory, i.e. homomorphic copies of the bare
theory. Representations are of course in general not isomorphic. But we say that duality
is a matter of two models of a common core, a bare theory, being indeed isomorphic with
respect to the structure of that core.
We stress that here we mean ‘representation’ in the mathematical, not the philo-
sophical, sense. The bare dual theories do not interpret the bare common core theory
(notwithstanding our use of the word ‘model’). Rather they are specific realizations or
formulations of the bare theory, like the matrix representations of an abstract group. But
agreed: the dual theories, and also often the bare theory, do get interpreted. Interpreta-
tion, and our choice of jargon, is further explained in Section 2.1.
We have developed this Schema in various papers. The most detailed one is our (2018).
It also illustrates the Schema with a major example: bosonization, which is a duality
between two quantum field theories in two spacetime dimensions—one with bosons, and
one with fermions. So here, a bosonic model is isomorphic to a fermionic model; (their
common core is a certain infinite-dimensional algebra). Other papers (De Haro (2016,
2018a), Butterfield (2018)) discuss in more detail duality’s relation to the interpretation
of theories, especially the various senses in which theories get called ‘equivalent’. Other
2See for example Castellani (2017), Dieks et al. (2015), Fraser (2017), Huggett (2017), Matsubara
(2013), Read (2016), Rickles (2017).
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papers discuss other advanced, indeed conjectural, examples in string theory (De Haro
(2015, 2017), De Haro et al. (2016, 2017)). And yet other papers discuss the less formal
aspects of dualities: in particular, their heuristic role in finding a theory “behind” the
bare theory, of which the dual models are only approximations not representations (De
Haro (2018)), and in relations to understanding (De Haro and De Regt (2018, 2018a)).3
Thus the aim of this paper is to relate the Schema to symmetries in more detail than
we have done previously. (Our previous discussion was in (2018: Sections 3.1.1, 3.2.4).)
The main topic will be the relations between symmetries of the common core theory, and
symmetries of one of the dual theories (one of the models of the common core). This topic
is an important preliminary to discussing the ‘interaction’ of symmetries with dualities.
It will call for care about what parts of a model “do the representing” of a common core;
(cf. Section 2.2’s distinction between model root and specific structure). It will also lead
to a classification of kinds of symmetry (Section 5, summarized in Section 5.4). Thus
we will give as much emphasis to symmetries as to dualities (usually treating symmetries
first).
To be as clear as possible, we will build up the details successively. In effect, Sections
2 and 3 set the stage for the main claims in the second half of the paper. We begin by
explaining the contrast between the two ‘levels’: the bare theory, and its models (realiza-
tions). This contrast is a prerequisite to our discussing symmetries and dualities, since it
can (should!) be explained for the case of a single model (realization): i.e. regardless of
whatever dualities, or symmetries, may hold good. This we do in Section 2. As we will
see, this involves various issues of interpretation, even controversy. And it prompts our
distinction between model root and specific structure.
We are thereby equipped to give a brief exposition of our Schema, and a more detailed
prospectus of the second half of the paper—i.e. of our account of the relations between
symmetries and dualities. These are in Section 3.
This account starts with symmetries in general: without regard to dualities, or even
our distinction between theories and the models that realize or represent them; (Sec-
tion 4). Here, we relate our basic idea of symmetry, as a map on states that preserves
quantities’ values, to some familiar topics: such as dynamical symmetries, how spacetime
theories treat symmetries, and what is the subset of quantities that it is “worthwhile” for
symmetries to preserve (cf. Caulton 2015). Then we discuss how symmetries fit with the
theory-model relation: but again without regard to dualities; (Section 5). Here, the differ-
ing amounts of structure at the levels of the bare theory and its models—the distinction
3We admit at the outset that because our Schema defines duality formally, without regard to the
isomorphism being surprising or scientifically important, it has many illustrations that are unremarkable,
and indeed not usually called dualities. We will see examples below: cf. Section 2.3. Contrast a case like
bosonization. Since bosons and fermions are very different, it is indeed a surprising isomorphism. It is also
scientifically important because it pairs situations of strong coupling in one dual (so that problems are in
general difficult to solve, since perturbation theory cannot be trusted) with situations of weak coupling
in the other dual: so one can sometimes solve a problem in the weak coupling regime of one dual and
transfer the result, so as to solve an intractable problem in the other dual. Broadly speaking, dualities’
scientific importance depends on these features: the isomorphism being surprising, and its relating strong
and weak coupling regimes. But features like importance and surprise are hard to be precise about: hence
our decision that it is best to define duality formally, even at the expense of countless trivial examples.
For more discussion, cf. De Haro and Butterfield (2018: Section 2.1) and De Haro (2018: Sections 1, 3.3).
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between model root and specific structure—will prompt definitions of three kinds of sym-
metry: which we call stipulated, accidental and proper. Finally in Section 6, we describe
how on our account, dualities preserve symmetries in a straightforward way. Section 7
concludes.
A final preliminary: our scope is limited. We will not engage in detail with two de-
bates that have been prominent in the recent philosophical literature about symmetries.
For these debates are orthogonal to most of this paper’s issues: which centre around the
relations between symmetries of the common core, and symmetries of its models. But for
completeness, we here briefly note these debates, and our broad view about them. They
both concern whether symmetry is always a sign of ‘surplus structure’, ‘redundancy’ or
‘gauge’: for the relation of this to duality, cf. our (2018: Section 3.2.4)
(1): Should two symmetry-related solutions of a theory: (a) be interpreted ab ini-
tio as representing the same physical state of affairs?; or (b) be taken merely to motivate
searching for a common ontology that secures such an interpretation? This debate is ar-
ticulated by Møller-Nielsen (2017) and, in relation to dualities, Read and Møller-Nielsen
(2018). These authors defend option (b). Broadly speaking, we agree with them, about
symmetries as well as dualities: (cf. De Haro (2016: Section 1.3), Butterfield (2018: Sec-
tions 1.2, 3.3) and De Haro (2018a: Section 2.3).
(2): Given a theory whose solution-space is partitioned by a group of symmetries—
i.e. solutions in the same same cell are symmetry-related—should we: (a) try to write down
a ‘quotiented’ (also known as: ‘reduced’) theory whose solutions correspond to the cells
of the partition; or (b) resist quotienting the given theory, but take its symmetry-related
solutions to be isomorphic? This debate is articulated, with (a) and (b) labelled ‘reduc-
tion’ and ‘sophistication’ respectively, by Dewar (2015: Sections 4 to 6; 2017); see also
Caulton (2015: pp. 156-157). Dewar defends sophistication. Broadly speaking, we are
sympathetic (De Haro (2018a: Section 3.2.3) and Butterfield (2018: Section 2.3)): reduc-
tion is not to be undertaken lightly. But the Schema does not commend one or the other:
we will encounter these two alternatives in Section 2.3.2, and we will see that the choice
between a ‘reduced’ or a ‘sophisticated’ formalism basically comes down to a choice of
representations.
2 Theories, Models, Model Roots and Specific Struc-
ture
We said at the beginning of Section 1 that on our account of duality, two dual theories
share a common core, which is itself a theory, the bare theory—and that they are iso-
morphic models of it. So to explain that account, we first need to explain our use of the
terms ‘theory’ and ‘model’: which, after all, have various (conflicting!) uses. We do this
in Section 2.1. This leads to: distinguishing within a model, what we will call the model
root (in most cases: a model triple) from the specific structure (Section 2.2); and giving
examples of this distinction (Section 2.3). Finally, we introduce notation for the values of
physical quantities on states (Section 2.4). Then we will be ready to define duality as an
isomorphism of model roots: details in Section 3.
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2.1 ‘Theory’ vs. ‘model’: interpretation
For the words ‘theory’ and ‘model’, the first point to make—the main idiosyncrasy in our
usage—arises from the fact that since a duality compares two theories, it involves two
“levels”: the common core “above” (more general and-or more abstract) and the theories
“below” (more specific and-or more concrete). On the other hand, one naturally thinks of
a theory as general and-or abstract, “standing above”, and “being common to”, its more
specific and-or concrete models. So in order to discuss duality, the question arises: should
we allocate the word ‘theory’ to the common core, or to each of the two dual theories?
We opt for the former. And since the two dual theories (so-called!) are indeed specific
and-or concrete realizations (versions, formulations) of this common core that we have
opted to call a ‘theory’, we also co-opt the word ‘model’ for the duals themselves. So the
overall effect of our jargon is to lift the use of the words ‘theory’ and ‘model’, “one level
up”.
As a simple example to illustrate our usage, consider position-momentum duality in
elementary Schro¨dinger-picture quantum mechanics. Although the position and momen-
tum representations might have been discovered, in a counterfactual history, as different
“theories” (since the Schro¨dinger equation takes very different forms in the position and
momentum bases, as do the operators and wave-functions), the discovery of the Fourier
transformation reveals that these are in fact two representations of a common core theory:
namely, quantum mechanics formulated in the basis-free language of Hilbert space. Thus
what in the counterfactual history is thought to be two distinct “theories”, is seen to be
just two models, i.e. representations, of a common structure, which we call elementary
quantum mechanics.
2.1.1 ‘Model’
So beware! This means that our use of ‘model’ rejects three common connotations of the
word.4 Namely, the connotations that a model is:
(i) a solution of the theory, or a history of the system concerned (often a trajectory
through the state-space), as against ‘all solutions’—which are the purview of the theory;
and-or
(ii) an approximation(s) to what the theory says (maybe about a specific regime or
system the theory is concerned with); and-or
(iii) a part of the empirical world—a hunk of reality!—that thus gives an interpretation
(or part of an interpretation) of the theory.
We will indeed later be concerned with the ideas (i) to (iii): (in fact, with (iii) in this
Subsection). But they are not part of our definition of ‘model’.
Instead, a model is for us a specific realization (or version or formulation) of a theory.
That is: it ‘models’ (verb!) another theory “above”, which in general also has other such
models. Almost always, it is a representation of the theory above, in the sense of mathe-
matical representation theory—‘representation’ being another word with confusingly di-
4In Section 5.2, we will recover the first notion, (i), of a ‘model’, as a special case of our usage. That
we here reject this connotation means that our models are not defined as in (i). But in Section 5.2’s
specific case, “models” in sense (i) turn out to be models in our sense.
6
verse uses. Recall the example, in this Section’s preamble, of position vs. momentum
representations.
And as we have announced: the main case for us of “the theory above” will be the
common core, the bare theory, of two dual theories (our ‘models’). (It is usually best
to think of the bare theory as uninterpreted, or abstract: though it may be interpreted:
cf. Section 2.1.3). So we say the two given theories are models of the bare theory; and
their being isomorphic models of the bare theory (isomorphic as regards the structure of
the bare theory) is what makes them duals.
2.1.2 ‘Theory’
As to our use of ‘theory’, the main thing to say is that it is mainstream: i.e. typical of the
literature, especially the literature on the semantic conception of theories as applied to
physics. Agreed: recent philosophy of science has emphasised many aspects of scientific
endeavour that hardly invoke the notion of scientific theory, central though this notion
was for discussions by both the positivists and their successors. For example, aspects such
as experiment (calibration of instruments etc.), causation (mechanistic explanation etc.),
and the social dimensions of knowledge (testimony etc.) have recently been discussed with
a strong emphasis on models (in a more usual sense than ours!), rather than theories.
We agree that these aspects of scientific endeavour are important for our philosophical
understanding of science (De Haro and De Regt (2018: Section 1.1)). But even if these
aspects do not need the notion of theory, still the notion may well be useful for other
aspects. Indeed, we believe it is indispensable for discussion of symmetries and dualities
in physics.5
More specifically: we can often think of a physical theory as a triple: a state-space S
(e.g. a Hilbert space in a quantum theory), a set of physical quantities Q (almost always
an algebra), and a dynamics D that describes how the values of quantities (on states)
change over time (and-or over space—so as to accommodate Euclidean theories). As we
said in Section 1, symmetries and dualities will concern the preservation or matching of
these values.6 So we will sometimes write a theory (and of course: a model in our sense)
as a triple, e.g. 〈S,Q,D〉. In any specific case, each of S, Q and D will of course have
further structure. For example:
(i): for a quantum theory, S will usually be a Hilbert space, or a set of density matrices;
for a classical theory, it will usually be a manifold, or a set of probability distributions;
(ii): for almost any theory, Q will be an algebra over the real or complex numbers,
allowing quantities to be added and multiplied; and
(iii): for almost any theory, the dynamics D can be understood either in Schro¨dinger
picture, with states changing over time and quantities fixed over time, or in Heisenberg
picture (vice versa).
Two clarifications about our treatment of a theory as a triple: the first formal, the
5We also believe it useful, even indispensable, in other discussions. One main one is understanding
renormalization—a topic for which, again, there has been scepticism about its usefulness: e.g. Kaiser
(2005: pp. 377-387). For a defence of the notion, cf. Butterfield (2014: Section IV.1).
6In addition, a theory often comes with stipulated symmetries. We will discuss these in Sections 4.2
and 5.1.
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second interpretative. First: note that we said: ‘we can often think of a physical theory
as a triple’, and ‘almost any’ in (ii) and (iii). For we agree that not every theory is
presented, or best thought of, in this way. Theories in statistical and quantum physics
are often formulated in terms of partition functions and-or path integrals with sources,
and related concepts like sets of correlation functions, rather than in terms of states and
quantities. And in field theories, the dynamics is often presented as field equations holding
at each spacetime point—and so not naturally thought of in terms of the Schro¨dinger or
Heisenberg pictures with their “background time”. But in this paper, we can think of
theories (and models, in our sense) as such triples: all our morals will carry over to these
other ways of formulating theories.7
Second: We admit that of course, a physical theory is almost never presented to us as
a tidy triple of state-space, quantities and dynamics. Almost always, the theory appears
to us messier than that: more vaguely defined and-or more complicated. The triple needs
to be extracted from that “mess”. Indeed, there are two points here.
(i): The complicated appearance is of course in part due to those aspects such as
experiment mentioned above. But this complexity, and the need to allow for such aspects
(and to assess them philosophically), does not militate against extracting a triple as a
concept useful for e.g. understanding symmetries.
(ii): We make no claim that there is always, or even typically, a unique best definition
of the triple. So presenting a theory as a triple usually involves: (a) choices about exactly
what to take as the state-space etc.; and even (b) judgment about interpretative and
perhaps controversial matters. We will see some examples of this variety, already in
Section 2.2; and we will see that these choices may affect verdicts of interest, e.g. whether
there is an isomorphism, or a duality.
2.1.3 Interpretation
This brings us to the interpretation of physical theories. A large subject! But here,
we only need to report another part of our overall position, which is again mainstream.
Namely, we endorse the endeavour of giving theories (and so: models in our sense) a classi-
cal referential semantics. That is: we envisage assigning references in the empirical world
to appropriate elements of theories—be they states and quantities (i.e. mathematical ob-
jects) for a theory presented as a triple, or words and sentences (i.e. linguistic objects)
for a theory presented in a language. This even-handedness between mathematical and
linguistic objects—and thus between theories as N -tuples and as sets of sentences—is
deliberate: for we endorse recent arguments against the traditional firm distinction be-
tween the semantic and syntactic conceptions of theory (Lutz (2017), Glymour (2013),
van Fraassen (2014)).8
7Of course, one can draw connections between formulations with states, quantities and dynamics—
our triple conception—and other types of formulation, like partition functions, path integrals and field
equations. For example, a partition function with a source that couples to an operator in the Lagrangian
of a quantum field theory is standardly used to calculate, by taking functional derivatives, the correlation
functions of that operator in the vacuum state. Cf. Section 4.4, and De Haro et al. (2017: pp. 75-76).
8And our phrase ‘words and sentences’ is to signal that the semantics is compositional in the usual
sense: viz. the reference assigned to a string of symbols is a function of the references assigned to the
symbols.
8
This even-handedness is one reason we call our endorsement of referential semantics
‘mainstream’. There are also two other reasons: the first is familiar in philosophy of
science, and the second is familiar in philosophy of language.
First: recall that accepting such referential semantics is independent, or at least largely
independent, of the debate over scientific realism. For that debate is largely about what
is the right attitude to our theories, not about their semantic content. Thus the arch
empiricist, van Fraassen, explicitly accepts a literal construal of the theoretical claims
of—i.e. a referential semantics for—scientific theories (1980: p. 14): as do other influential
positions that reject realism, such as Fine’s ‘natural ontological attitude’ (1984: pp. 96-99,
1986: p. 130).
Second: we should recall the moral of Lewis’ seminal paper, ‘Languages and Language’
(1975). Lewis begins by rehearsing a thesis and an antithesis: the task of the paper, and
his moral, is to reconcile them in a synthesis—which indeed he accomplishes. Thus the
thesis begins by saying that a language is an assignment ‘of meanings to certain sequences
of types of sound or of marks ...’ (p. 3). As this quote hints: the thesis is advocacy of a
referential semantics; (indeed an intensional semantics—cf. below). The antithesis begins
by saying that ‘language is a social phenomenon wherein people utter strings of vocal
sounds ... and wherein people respond by thought or action to the sounds they observe to
have been produced’ (ibid). As this quote hints: the antithesis is advocacy of an account
of language emphasising people’s propositional attitudes (intentions, beliefs, desires etc.):
both as what is communicated by language, and as what underpins that communication.
Thus Lewis’ synthesis is his account of what it is for a language L, a` la the thesis, to be
the language used by a human population, a` la the antithesis. The main idea is that this
is a matter of the population having conventions (in Lewis’ sense) of truthfulness in L and
trust in L. Thus he knits the thesis and antithesis together in a detailed way (and replies
to various objections). He ends by saying: ‘According to the proposal I have presented,
the philosophy of language is a single subject. The thesis and antithesis have been the
property of different schools; but in fact they are complementary essential ingredients in
any adequate account either of languages or of language’ (p. 35).
To which we say: ‘Hear, hear!’. That is: we claim a similar reconciliation between our
advocating a referential semantics for scientific theories, and various lines of philosophi-
cal work that downplay, or even do not mention, reference or theories. Thus some work
on some of the aspects of scientific endeavour, mentioned above, seems sceptical, not just
about ‘theory’ as a useful notion, but also about reference. For example: much philosoph-
ical writing about experiment (calibration of instruments etc.) emphasizes non-linguistic
skills, practices and norms; and much philosophical writing about the social dimensions
of knowledge emphasizes the wider and practical world, e.g. the functioning of scientific
communities and institutions in e.g. the maintenance of norms, such as accreditation, etc.
Such emphases are entirely appropriate, say we. Study of experiment should of course
emphasize non-linguistic skills; and so on. But such emphases in no way militate against
developing a referential semantics for scientific language, and so for scientific theories.
In short, we think Lewis’ synthesis gives a valuable, because irenic, perspective on this
work’s relation to referential semantics.9
9More controversially: we think Lewis’ synthesis gives a valuable, because deflating, perspective on
9
So much by way of defending ourselves as having mainstream views about interpreta-
tion. The upshot is that we envisage a referential semantics using interpretation maps,
i. These are maps on states or quantities (s ∈ S etc.), or on linguistic items, assigning
as values (outputs of the map) parts of the empirical world (hunks of reality!). But they
are, in general, partial maps; i.e. for some arguments, the map yields no value (output).
For some details and examples, see De Haro (2018a).10
In the next Section we will contrast internal and external interpretations, both of which
are interpretations in the above sense. Roughly speaking, an internal interpretation only
interprets that “part” of the model that is “the homomorphic copy” of the theory, while
an external interpretation can interpret all of the model.
2.2 Model roots, specific structure, and their interpretations
As hinted at the end of the previous Section, we need some more jargon and notation
about the relation between a bare theory and its models that will allow us to distinguish
the parts or aspects of models that are “shadows” of corresponding parts or aspects of
the bare theory, from those that are not.
The jargon is clearest for the common case, which we will focus on throughout this
paper: when the realization of the bare theory proceeds by (mathematical) representation,
and the bare theory is a triple comprising a state-space S, a set of quantities Q and
a dynamics D: (cf. Section 2.1.2 and footnote 7). Although the bare theory may be
interpreted (like its models, the dual theories, usually are), adding the adjective ‘bare’
signals helpfully that the theory is “above” and can be / is often uninterpreted.11
In this common case: by the very definition of ‘representation’, the model gives a
homomorphic copy of the bare theory (irrespective of there being a duality). That is:
there are appropriate structure-preserving maps from the states, quantities and dynamics
of the bare theory to the model’s homomorphic copy. To be precise: there is a pair of
structure-preserving maps—from states in the bare theory to states in the model, and
the burgeoning literature about scientific representation; viz. along the lines Callender and Cohen’s claim
that we should analyse representation in science in terms drawn from philosophy of language and mind
(2006, especially Section 3).
10In fact, we endorse a specific programme within the general enterprise of referential semantics.
Namely: intensional semantics in the sense developed by Carnap, Montague and Lewis in which:
(i) the notion of ‘linguistic meaning’ is taken to be ambiguous between what Frege called ‘sense’ and
what he called ‘reference’, here called ‘intension’ and ‘extension’ respectively; and
(ii) intension is modelled as a function taking linguistic items—and for us, states or quantities—to
their reference, relative to a possible world.
But in this paper, we will not need the details of this view. A standard exposition is Lewis (1970); besides,
pp. 16-17 of his (1975) give a fine sketch, including a defence of semantics adverting to possible worlds.
Our own endorsement is in: De Haro and Butterfield (2018: Section 2.3), Butterfield (2018: Section 3.1),
De Haro and De Regt (2018).
11We take the point, from Read and Møller-Nielsen (2018: Section 5.3), that not every common core
need be so rich as to lead to a theory (in the present case, not every common core needs to allow being
written as a triple). But we will simply restrict our attention to cases in which the common core is as
rich as a theory, which we submit are the most interesting cases—and indeed they seem to be the most
common cases in the literature on dualities. See also De Haro (2018a: §2.1.1; footnote 30).
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S D−−→ Syh yh
SM DM−−→ SM
Figure 1: The model’s (Schro¨dinger) dynamics implements that of the bare theory.
from quantities in the bare theory to quantities in the model. And there is a meshing
condition on the model’s dynamics that makes it implement that of the bare theory.
The details are as follows: though we can mostly take them in our stride, and just say
‘homomorphic copy’.12
We can write the bare theory as a triple T = 〈S,Q,D〉; and similarly its model
M = 〈SM ,QM ,DM〉, where the subscripts signal that the state-space etc. are different
from that of the bare theory. If we think of the dynamics in Schro¨dinger style as a map
on the state-space (more details in Section 2.4), and write the homomorphism from S
to SM as h, then the meshing condition on the model’s dynamics will be the commuting
diagram in Figure 1.
Once we have the distinction of levels, i.e. a bare theory represented by a model, there
is an important distinction to be made within the model. (This is important irrespective
of there being a duality.) Namely between:
(i): the parts and aspects of the model which together express its realizing the bare
theory;
(ii): the parts and aspects which do not express the realization.
We will call (i) the model root. And in the common case where the bare theory, and so
also the model, is a triple of states, quantities and dynamics, we will call (i) the model
triple. And we will call (ii) the model’s specific structure. We can think of it as the
‘ingredients’ or ‘building blocks’ by which the representation of the bare theory, i.e. (i),
is built.
There is a correlative distinction between two kinds of interpretation. Recall from
Section 2.1.3 that an interpretation is given by interpretation maps, i.e. functions (in
general, partial functions) mapping items in the theory to items in the world. Thus we
say that an internal interpretation is one that only interprets the model root: it maps
all of and only the model root to items in the world, regardless of the specific structure.
On the other hand, an external interpretation also maps (some or all of) the specific
structure to items in the world.
Of course, ingredients are present in the cooked dish, and building blocks are present
in the built house. Similarly here: often, an item of specific structure is in the model
12So the relation of representation between a bare theory and a model of it will involve not just one
map as in, say, group representation theory (the homomorphism from the abstract group to e.g. a set
of matrices), but at least two maps. We will see in Section 3.1 that these two maps are related to each
other, because states and quantities are dual (in mathematicians’ sense!) to one another.
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root, though (by definition) it is not part of the representation of the bare theory. And
in such a case an internal interpretation does not interpret the item of specific structure.
(Section 2.3 will give examples.)
Thus the distinction between specific structure (‘building blocks’), and model root
(‘what gets built’) is physically significant, in that it constrains interpretation. It is for-
mal in that it can be stated without giving an interpretation: but it has consequences for
interpretation. For more discussion, cf. De Haro (2016: Section 1.1.2, 2018: Section 2.2.3),
De Haro and Butterfield (2018: Section 3.2.2), and De Haro (2018a: Section 2.1.2).
But we stress that even within a given model, the distinction is not ‘God-given’. It is
relative to how exactly we define the bare theory, and thereby the homomorphism from
it to the model. And for a physical theory, as usually presented to us informally and even
vaguely, there need be no best or most natural way to make this exact definition. For
recall comment (ii) at the end of Section 2.1.2: how exactly to present a theory as a triple
of states, quantities and dynamics is a matter of choice and even judgment.
We will see this flexibility in play later, in Section 2.3, where we will have a choice to
define the model root either as a single representation of a structure (with a further choice
to include or not to include a choice of basis in the model root) or as an equivalence class
of representations.
We will also see it in connection with dualities, in Section 2.3.2. For as we announced:
we say a duality is an isomorphism of models of a bare theory; (details in Section 3.1).
But this means: an isomorphism with respect to the structure of the bare theory—which
is the structure that the models represent. Therefore the isomorphism that is the duality
is an isomorphism of model roots. And in the common case of triples of states, quanti-
ties and dynamics: it is an isomorphism of model triples.13 So the flexibility about the
definition of a bare theory, and so about what a model must represent, leads to flexibility
about exactly what the duality mapping is, i.e. what is the isomorphism between model
roots.
It is worth having a notation distinguishing between the model root (which is usually a
model triple of states etc.) and the specific structure. So given a model M , we now write
m for its model root. This is usually a model triple, which we now write as 〈SM ,QM ,DM〉.
Again, the subscripts signal that the state-space etc. are different from those of the bare
theory. We also write M¯ for the specific structure. So we write a model M of a bare
theory T as
M =: 〈m; M¯〉 = 〈SM ,QM ,DM ; M¯〉 , (1)
where the semi-colon in the defined angle-bracket signals the contrast between root and
specific structure, and the last equation just expresses the usual case of the root being a
triple.
13A clarification: This is not to say that the specific structure (the ‘building blocks’) is always ‘invisible’
to the other side of the duality, i.e. that no part of the specific structure is mapped across by a duality to
the other model. Often, some part of the specific structure is mapped across. Indeed, that is unsurprising.
For the model root is built from specific structure: so one expects that in order to map the model roots,
one into the other, the duality must map at least part of the specific structure, one into the other.
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But beware: one should not think of M as just the ordered pair of independently
given m and M¯ . For m is built by using the specific structure M¯ , and so it is not given
independently of M¯ . Rather, m encodes M ’s representing the bare theory T . So one
might well write TM instead of m, since having a subscript M on the right hand side of
the equation M = 〈TM ; M¯〉 signals that M is not an ordered pair of two independently
given items. In other words: the notation TM emphasises that the model triple: (i) is a
representation of T , (ii) is built from M ’s specific structure viz. M¯ , and (iii) is itself a
theory (hence the letter ‘T’).
Here is an illustration of this notation in use. As announced: we say that a duality
is an isomorphism of model roots, with respect to the structure of the bare theory. So
if M1,M2 are models of a bare theory T , their being duals means: m1 ∼= m2. And in
the usual case of model triples, i.e. mi = 〈SM i ,QM i ,DM i〉 , i = 1, 2: this isomorphism
of roots will be a matter of two appropriately meshing isomorphisms, one between the
state-spaces SM i and one between the quantity algebras QM i . Details in Section 3.1.
2.3 Examples: matrix representations and Galilean transforma-
tions
In this Section, we will illustrate our notions of theory and model, and the contrast
of model root vs. specific structure. Our first example (Section 2.3.1) is from matrix
representations; our second example (Section 2.3.2) is about Galilean transformations in
Newtonian mechanics. The latter example will also illustrate our notion of interpretation
from Section 2.1.3, especially our internal vs. external contrast from Section 2.2.
2.3.1 Matrix representations
Perhaps the simplest illustration of these notions, model root and specific structure, comes
from defining the bare theory to be just an abstract group G; and as usual, taking
realizations to be representations.14 So let us consider matrix representations of G. More
specifically: we consider for a finite group G, a set {Mi} of n× n complex matrices with
non-zero determinant (i runs from 1 to the order of G). That is: Mi ∈ GL(n,C). In such
a representation, the choices of the size n of the matrices and of the ground-field (R or C)
are of course parts of specific structure: for these are building blocks by which we build
the homomorphic copy of G.
But even in this simple illustration, we can see further options about how exactly to
define model root and specific structure. These options relate to the fact that the unitary
group U(n) acts on GL(n,C), by M 7→ UMU−1 ≡ UMU †. Each U ∈ U(n) sends a repre-
sentation {Mi} to another representation, called ‘equivalent’; and representation theory
then of course concentrates on equivalence classes of representations, characterizing them
in terms of their invariants, especially characters. The spirit of the enterprise is that a
unitary change of basis has no mathematical significance. This means there are two main
options, (A) and (B) below, about how to define the model root, and thereby, also the
14Strictly speaking, a bare theory must have an appropriate set of maps to the real numbers, to express
the values of quantities, and even a dynamics. But for the sake of illustration, we here ignore these maps.
Anyway, Section 2.3.2 will sketch an illustration from physics.
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specific structure—and there will be further choices.15
(A): Model root as representation:— We can say that a single representation {Mi} is
the model root. Indeed: multiplication of the matrices Mi realizes a homomorphic copy
of G’s multiplication. And it is no objection that items of specific structure—the size of
the matrices n, and the choice of the ground-field—are ‘in’ the matrices Mi. For as we
said: that an item appears in a model root does not prevent it appearing in the specific
structure. After all, the model root is built from the specific structure.
On this option, two equivalent representations of G, i.e. a set of matrices {Mi} and
another set {U Mi U−1}, for some fixed U ∈ U(n), will be isomorphic, as homomorphic
copies of G’s multiplication. So on our account of duality, they are duals. (As we will
discuss in Section 3: this reflects our definition of duality being logically weak i.e. having
many instances.)
But there is also a further choice. For the fact that the matrices realize group multi-
plication is independent of their acting as linear operators on the vector space Cn. That
is: although we always think of a matrix as representing (that word again!) a linear
operator, it only does so relative to a choice of basis—and the representation we began
with, viz. h : G → {Mi}, makes no such choice. But if we wish, we can adjoin such a
choice to our model. That is: we can stipulate that the matrix representation {Mi} also
has, as part of its specific structure, some specific basis ek (k = 1, . . . , n) of Cn.
Once such a choice is made, the basis vectors ek (and thereby all vectors v =
∑n
k=1 vk ek)
are of course acted upon—sent to another basis—by the similarity transformations U that
act on the matrices Mi. That is: ek 7→
∑n
l=1 Ukl el when Mi 7→ U Mi U−1. But the idea
of the stipulation is that the first-chosen basis ek labels the representation: it fixes the
interpretation of the {Mi} as linear operators. It is just that this labelling basis maps
across to the labelling bases of equivalent representations. This illustrates the idea in
footnote 13 that—to return to our jargon—specific structure can map across a duality. In
this example, the duality maps a labelling basis to another basis: {ek} 7→ {
∑n
l=1 Ukl el}
when Mi 7→ U Mi U−1.
(B): Model root as equivalence class:— We can say that an equivalence class of representations—
the entire orbit of a given {Mi} under the action of U(n)—is the model root. For indeed:
equivalent representations realize the very same homomorphic copy of G’s multiplication.
Again, the size of the matrices n, and the choice of the ground-field, are ‘in’ the model
root (since they are preserved by equivalence). And again, it is no objection that an item
in the model root is also in the specific structure: since the model root is built from the
specific structure.
On option (B), there are still duals, on our account of duality—despite the option’s
having “quotiented” to a more abstract notion of model than that of option (A). For we
can vary n; and-or we can vary the ground-field. That is: two different choices of n can
provide two model roots—the equivalence class of a representation {Mi} : Mi ∈ GL(n1,C),
15Roughly speaking, (B) takes roots to be equivalence classes of what (A) takes them to be. One might
question whether (A)’s “concrete” matrices are really more “basic” than their equivalence classes as in
(B). But exposition of the issues is much clearer if we keep the (A) vs. (B) contrast.
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and the equivalence class of a representation {Mj} : Mj ∈ GL(n2,C)—that instantiate
the same homomorphic copy of G. And similarly, we can vary the ground-field, and
yet instantiate the same homomorphic copy of G. And similarly, we can consider non-
linear/non-matrix realizations/representations of G.
And as in option (A), there is the further choice—again because the fact that matrices
realize group multiplication is independent of their acting as linear operators on the vector
space Cn. That is: if we wish, we can adjoin to a model root—an entire equivalence class
of representations—the choice of some specific basis ek (k = 1, . . . , n) of Cn, which we can
then take to be specific structure. Of course, the only natural way to do this is to attach
the basis to some arbitrary element of the class, i.e. one set of matrices {Mi}, and then
transport the basis around to the other elements of the equivalence class by the action of
U(n).
2.3.2 Galilean transformations
Newtonian mechanics provides a simple illustration of the notions of model root, specific
structure, and indeed duality. And since it is an example from physics rather than pure
mathematics, we also get an illustration of Section 2.2’s distinction between internal and
external interpretations.
The idea is as follows. The bare theory T is Newtonian mechanics, of say N gravitating
point-particles, set in a Galilean (neo-Newtonian) spacetime: i.e. in a spacetime manifold
that is ‘globally like R4’, with Euclidean geometry in its instantaneous time-slices, and a
flat 4-dimensional connection, but no preferred absolute rest. This bare theory is modelled
(in our sense: i.e. realized, represented) by formulations of Newtonian mechanics of N
gravitating particles, set in a Newtonian spacetime, i.e. in a spacetime that is ‘globally
like R4’ but that does have an absolute rest.
Famously (notoriously!), the difference in such formulations’ specifications of absolute
rest is not experimentally detectable, since specifications that are each boosted with re-
spect to the other specify the same flat 4-dimensional connection, and a boost maps a
solution of the equations of motion to another solution. Or as it is usually put, in more
physical terms: no experiment in Newtonian mechanics can distinguish one specification
of rest from the others, because the theory is invariant under boosts (‘has boosts as a
symmetry’). Hence, of course, the debate between Newton and Leibniz, as articulated
in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, and with its long legacy down to the present day
(e.g. Earman 1989).
So in this example, it is natural to say that the specific structure of each model
includes its specification of absolute rest. Using this specification, the model defines a flat
4-dimensional connection—viz. the same connection as is defined by the other models—
and thereby builds a homomorphic copy of T .
We can make this example simpler and precise, and yet still a worthwhile illustration,
by taking the bare theory T to be just the abstract Galilean group Gal(3). This is a
10-dimensional Lie group, whose generators are three spatial rotations, four (space and
time) translations, and three boosts. That is: its generators are usually thus described,
by way of justifying their commutation relations. But of course the abstract group can
be defined by the commutation relations, free of a physical interpretation. Thinking of
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Gal(3) like this will yield a clear analogy with Section 2.3.1’s matrix representations of
an abstract group G, and with that Section’s option (A), i.e. Model root as representation.
Gal(3) is usually presented in its fundamental representation. Namely, as a concrete
group of transformations on (bijections of) R4, written in terms of the standard coordi-
nates (x, t) ∈ R4, with g ∈ Gal(3) represented as the function
g(x, t) := (R · x + v0 t+ r0, t+ t0) , (2)
where R is a 3 × 3 spatial rotation matrix, v0 is the velocity boost, r0 is the spatial
translation vector, and t0 is the time translation. This fundamental representation can
also be expressed in a coordinate-free way as an action on the affine space of R4, i.e. on
Euclidean 4-space. But we will not need the details of affine spaces (cf. e.g. Auslander
and MacKenzie (1963, Chapter 1)).
But just as in Section 2.3.1’s option (A), where a model root was a matrix represen-
tation of a group G, we could adjoin a choice of a basis ek (k = 1, . . . , n) of Cn as specific
structure: so also here, we can adjoin a choice of an inertial coordinate system as specific
structure, and we can take this to give the model’s specification of absolute rest.16 The
standard coordinate system defined by the components of R4 itself is then just one choice
among many, determining one specification of absolute rest among many. Natural though
we find it for writing down the fundamental action of Gal(3), as we did in Eq (2), the
action can of course be written down in any inertial coordinate system. And any such
system can be taken to give a model’s specification of absolute rest.
And just as in (A) of Section 2.3.1, each matrix Mi mapped the adjoined basis ek to
another basis: so also here, each Galilean boost maps an adjoined choice of absolute rest,
represented mathematically by an inertial coordinate system, into another such choice,
i.e. another inertial coordinate system.17
But there is also, so far, a disanalogy with (A) of Section 2.3.1. For so far, we have
just one model root, encapsulated in Eq. (2), and various choices of specific structure;
whereas (A) of Section 2.3.1 had many different model roots—many different matrix rep-
resentations {Mi} of the abstract group G. Correlatively, our fundamental representation
of Gal(3) is faithful, i.e. has trivial kernel; while Section 2.3.1’s {Mi} were in general not
faithful.
But there are other representations of Gal(3). Indeed, there is a matrix representa-
tion that is isomorphic, as a model root, to what we have. So it is faithful—and the
isomorphism of model roots is, on our account, a duality. Namely, we use 5 × 5 matri-
ces G ∈ GL(5,R) (G for ‘Galileo’ not ‘group’ !), that act on vectors (xA) := (x, t, 1) ∈
16We say ‘give’—meaning ‘determine’—rather than ‘be’, simply because a coordinate system includes
choices of spatial and temporal origins and units, and of an orientation of spatial axes, as well as the
absolute rest, i.e. the timelike congruence of inertial worldlines.
17Of course, Galilean transformations that are not boosts keep fixed the choice of absolute rest: cf. foot-
note 16.
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R4 × {1} ⊂ R5, as follows (cf. Bargmann (1954: pp. 38-41) and Holm (2011: p 10)):
x˜A =
5∑
B=1
GAB xB (3)
(GAB)
5
A,B=1 :=
 R v0 r001×3 1 t0
01×3 0 1
 .
With this representation, a specification of absolute rest is given by a specific choice of
vector x ∈ R4×{1}. Namely, (xA) := (x, t, 1) ∈ R4×{1} specifies rest to be the timelike
congruence of inertial worldlines parallel to the inertial worldline passing through both
the spatiotemporal origin (0, 0) and the point (x, t). So here, it is a single vector that
gets adjoined as specific structure; (not a whole basis, as in Section 2.3.1, and not a whole
inertial coordinate system, as above). And each Galilean boost maps an adjoined choice
of absolute rest, given by a vector x ∈ R4 × {1}, into another such choice, i.e. another
vector.
So much by way of how Galilean transformations’ illustration of the notions of model
root and specific structure is analogous with Section 2.3.1’s matrices. We end with two
comments, [1] and [2], about the physical interpretation of this example (comments which
thereby have no analogues about those matrices). For simplicity and brevity, we will
restrict both comments to the simple “vacuum” scenario which we have concentrated on:
i.e. R4 as a description of either neo-Newtonian or Newtonian spacetime, without regard
to the N gravitating point-particles we mentioned at the start of this Section. Thus re-
call that we concentrated on taking the bare theory T to be just the abstract Galilean
group Gal(3), and considered its action on R4. But this is only for simplicity: these two
comments carry over to the non-vacuum scenario, where there are particles.18
[1]: Agreement with usual verdicts:— The first comment looks ahead to Section 4.4’s
discussion of symmetries in a spacetime theory, i.e. a theory that postulates a spacetime
with certain chrono-geometric structures like metrics and connection. (Such theories of
18It is just that it would take too long to spell out the non-vacuum scenario. To glimpse why, we briefly
note some of the issues one confronts. Obviously, one must consider the particles’ state-space: which one
would build from their configuration space (the “qs”), by adding either velocities (“q˙s”: defining velocity
phase space, in the Lagrangian framework) or canonical momenta (“ps”: defining phase space, in the
Hamiltonian framework). At first sight, the N particles’ configuration space is “just” R3N . But there
are subtleties to be dealt with. Indeed: not only the topics mentioned above, of passing to the affine
space so as to “rub out” the preferred origin, and whether to have an absolute rest; but also whether to
excise collision points, i.e. whether to forbid point-particles to be in the very same place. Assuming these
subtleties are dealt with, and the Lagrangian or Hamiltonian state-space is constructed, one would then
consider the action of the Euclidean group on this state-space, lifted from its action on R3. Again, there
are subtleties about this lifted action; and to treat boosts and so represent the Galilean group, one needs
to “add a time axis”, defining what is often called ‘extended (velocity) phase space’. For a philosophical
introduction to all these subtleties, cf. e.g. Belot (2000: Sections 3,4) and Butterfield (2006: Section 2.3).
These two comments also bear on the two debates about interpreting symmetries, which we set aside
at the end of Section 1. Indeed the authors cited take Newtonian gravitation as a main example. But
again, these debates are orthogonal to most of this paper’s issues; so that it would take too long to spell
out, beyond the references we gave there, exactly what these comments imply for them.
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course also postulate matter and radiation, particles and fields, in the spacetime; but as
just announced, we are setting that aside.)
We will see in Section 4.4 that in a spacetime theory, a symmetry is usually defined as
a map on the spacetime that (once its domain of definition is extended in the natural way
to include chrono-geometric structures and matter fields): (i) fixes, i.e. does not alter,
the chrono-geometric structures, and (ii) maps a matter-field solution of the equations
of motion to another solution. (We will also see how this relates to the more basic and
general notion of symmetry we will use from the start of Section 4.) Accordingly, boosts
are a symmetry of neo-Newtonian spacetime: for a boost preserves the chrono-geometric
structures, i.e. the spatial and temporal metrics and the flat affine connection, and maps
solutions to solutions. But boosts are not a symmetry of Newtonian spacetime (i.e. a
spacetime that is globably like R4, but that has a specification of absolute rest). For
a boost does not fix a specification of rest.19 These points are, in effect, the modern
mathematical expression of the famous (notorious!) point with which this Section began:
that no mechanical experiment can discern which is the putatively correct standard of
rest.
Our discussion above, and our notions of model root, duality etc., accords with this.
In particular, just as in Section 2.3.1: an item of specific structure can be “in” the model
root, which is, after all, built with specific structure; and so an isomorphism of model roots
(on our account, a duality) can map specific structure from one model to another. And
this is what Galilean boosts do. In our jargon: they define an isomorphism of model roots
that maps one model’s specification of absolute rest into another’s. Think for example
of how the vector (xA) := (x, t, 1) ∈ R4 × {1}—which specifies rest as parallelism to the
inertial worldline through both the origin (0, 0) and the point (x, t)—is mapped by GAB
of Eq. (3) to a vector specifying rest as parallelism to the inertial worldline through both
the origin (0, 0) and the point (R · x + v0 t + r0, t + t0). (For more detail about how the
duality maps in this example are defined by boosts, cf. Butterfield (2018: Section 4.1).)
But mapping one model’s specification of absolute rest into another’s is not the same as
fixing the given specification, i.e. not the same as a symmetry in spacetime theories’ usual
sense. Thus this example illustrates how a bare theory can have a symmetry, viz. boosts,
that (some or even all) its models lack. This will later be a main theme (Sections 5.1 and
5.2).
This example also has a philosophical moral that is not about symmetry. Namely:
duality does not imply physical equivalence. Two theories can be duals—in our jargon:
models with isomorphic model roots—without their making the very same claims about
the world. They can even contradict one another about the world, as do two rival speci-
fications of what is absolute rest. This leads in to the next comment.
[2]: Internal and external interpretations:— The example also illustrates Section 2.2’s
distinction between internal and external interpretations. As usual, interpretative issues
are underdetermined by formal theory: witness the moral just stated at the end of [1].
However, the example clearly allows us to formulate the disagreement between Newton
19On the other hand: spatial rotations and spatiotemporal translations are symmetries of both space-
times.
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(Clarke) and Leibniz—the question whether absolute rest is physically real—in terms of
the internal vs. external contrast.
For recall that an internal interpretation interprets only the model root, but not the
specific structure. More precisely, we define this as meaning that specific structure which is
“in” a model root as a building block, does not get interpreted. Therefore models that are
isomorphic, i.e. have isomorphic roots, and so differ only in their specific structure, must
receive the same interpretation.20 Thus in our example: an internal interpretation of a
model simply does not interpret the specification of rest (whether it is given by an inertial
coordinate system considered as rest, as for equation (2), or by a vector x ∈ R4 × {1}, as
for equation (3)). In short: the specification of rest is not part of what is physical. Thus
an internal interpretation articulates Leibniz’ relationist views.
On the other hand, an external interpretation (by definition) does interpret (some
or all of) the specific structure. Thus an external interpretation can take any two dual
models—any isomorphic model roots with different specifications of rest, x and x˜ say—to
have distinct interpretations. This kind of external interpretation thus articulates the
Newton-Clarke view: in short, that giving all material bodies the same boost makes a
physical difference.
2.4 Values of quantities on states
Before formally defining duality as isomorphism, we need notation for treating states,
quantities and dynamics. Suppose we are given a set of states S, a set of quantities Q
and a dynamics D: 〈S,Q,D〉. (As stressed in Section 1: in any specific case, S, Q and
D will each have a lot of structure beyond being sets—but we will not need these details
in what follows. And as admitted in Section 2.1.2: not all theories are presented, or best
thought of, as such triples—but what we say will carry over to other formulations using
e.g. partition functions; cf. footnote 7.)
Then we write the value of quantity Q in state s as
〈Q, s〉 (4)
It is these values that are to be preserved, or suitably matched, by the duality, i.e. by the
isomorphism of model triples: cf. Eq. (9) below. And in subsequent Sections’ discussion
of symmetry, it is these values that are to be preserved by a symmetry map.
For classical physics, one naturally represents (that word again!) a quantity as a real-
valued function on states: Q : s 7→ Q(s). Given such a function representing the quantity,
〈Q, s〉 := Q(s) ∈ R is the system’s possessed or intrinsic value, in state s, of the quantity
Q. Similarly for quantum physics: one naturally represents quantities as linear operators
on a Hilbert space of states, so that 〈Q, s〉 := 〈s|Qˆ|s〉 ∈ R is the system’s Born-rule
expectation value of the quantity. (But in fact, for quantum dualities, the duality often
preserves off-diagonal matrix elements 〈s1|Qˆ|s2〉 ∈ C: cf. below.)
20Recall that Newtonian gravitation contains unphysical singularities when two massive point particles
coincide, as they can do after a finite time (see footnote 18). Thus internal interpretations of isomorphic
model roots of Newtonian gravitation must either give the same “interpretation” to the unphysical sin-
gularities (usually: signaling a limitation of the applicability of the theory), or one must deal with the
singularities in some other way. See the discussion in De Haro (2018a: Sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2(C)).
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As to dynamics, here assumed deterministic:— This can be usually presented in two
ways, for which we adopt the quantum terminology, viz. the ‘Schro¨dinger’ and ‘Heisenberg’
pictures; (though the ideas occur equally in classical physics). We will adopt for simplicity
the Schro¨dinger picture. So we say: dS is an action of the real line R representing time
on S.
There is an equivalent Heisenberg picture of dynamics with DH , an action of R rep-
resenting time on Q. The pictures are related by, in an obvious notation:
dS : R×S 3 (t, s) 7→ dS(t, s) =: s(t) ∈ S iff DH : R×Q 3 (t, Q) 7→ DH(t, Q) =: Q(t) ∈ Q
(5)
where for all s ∈ S considered as the initial state, and all quantities Q ∈ Q, the values of
physical quantities at the later time t agree in the two pictures:
〈Q, s(t)〉 = 〈Q(t), s〉 . (6)
3 The Schema: Duality as Isomorphism of Model
Roots
In this Section, we summarize our account of duality. This account has been developed
mainly by De Haro (2016: Section 1, 2016a: Section 1), but also more fully by us together
(2018: Sections 2, 3). As a mnemonic, we label this account a Schema. We first define
duality (Section 3.1); then we give a prospectus for the following Sections (Section 3.2).
It will be clear that our Schema is logically weak, so that there are countless examples,
including elementary ones: a topic taken up in footnote 3’s references.
3.1 Duality defined
We can now present our Schema for duality as an isomorphism between model roots
(model triples). Let M1,M2 be two models, with model roots m1 and m2 and specific
structure M¯1 and M¯2; so that, with the notation Eq. (1), we have: M1 = 〈m1; M¯1〉 and
M2 = 〈m2; M¯2〉. We can suppose that M1,M2 are both models of a bare theory T . Then
we say that M1 and M2 are dual if their model roots are isomorphic, i.e. if m1 ∼= m2.
More specifically, if the model roots are triples m1 = 〈SM1 ,QM1 ,DM1〉 and m2 =
〈SM2 ,QM2 ,DM2〉, then to say that the model triples m1,m2 are isomorphic is to say,
in short, that: there are isomorphisms between their respective state-spaces and sets of
quantities, that
(i) make values match, and
(ii) are equivariant for the two triples’ dynamics (in the Schro¨dinger and Heisen-
berg pictures, respectively).21
Thus these maps are our rendering of the correspondence between duals: of, in physics
21Alternatively, in other formalisms (cf. footnote 7), the dynamics in one model is mapped into the
dynamics in the other. For an example, where the dynamics is a set of covariant Euler-Lagrange equations,
see De Haro (2018a: Section 3).
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jargon, ‘the dictionary’.
Thus we say: A duality between m1 = 〈SM1 ,QM1 ,DM1〉 and m2 = 〈SM2 ,QM2 ,DM2〉
requires:
(1): an isomorphism between the state-spaces (almost always: Hilbert spaces, or
for classical theories, manifolds):
dS : SM1 → SM2 using d for ‘duality’ ; and (7)
(2): an isomorphism between the sets (almost always: algebras) of quantities
dQ : QM1 → QM2 using d for ‘duality’ ; (8)
such that: (i) the values of quantities match:
〈Q1, s1〉1 = 〈dQ(Q1), dS(s1)〉2 , ∀Q1 ∈ QM1 , s1 ∈ SM1 . (9)
and: (ii) dS is equivariant for the two triples’ dynamics, DS:1, DS:2, in the Schro¨dinger
picture; and dQ is equivariant for the two triples’ dynamics, DH:1, DH:2, in the Heisenberg
picture: see Figure 2.
SM1 dS−−→ SM2yDS:1 yDS:2
SM1 dS−−→ SM2
QM1
dQ−−→ QM2yDH:1 yDH:2
QM1
dQ−−→ QM2
Figure 2: Equivariance of duality and dynamics, for states and quantities.
Eq. (2) appears to favour m1 over m2; but in fact does not, thanks to the maps d
being bijections.
This definition of duality can be simplified, since the requirement that the values of
quantities match, Eq. (9), implies relations between the duality maps dS and dQ. Thus
in the quantum case, the duality maps are related by: dQ(Q) = dS ◦Q ◦ d−1S (where dS is
constrained to be unitary).22 Thus duality comes down to a single duality map on states,
dS , together with appropriate equivariance conditions on the quantities and the dynamics.
Similarly in the classical case: though representing quantities as real-valued functions
on the state-space, rather than as maps on the state-space, means that the relation be-
tween the duality maps dS and dQ is a little different. Here, we need the notion of a dual
22The proof is as follows. As mentioned in Section 2.4, Eq. (9) generalizes to matrix elements between
arbitrary vector states s, s′ in the state-space, which in the quantum case is a Hilbert space. Namely, the
duality maps must satisfy: 〈s′|Q|s〉1 = 〈dS(s′)|dQ(Q)|dS(s)〉2. Notice that we can rewrite this purely as
an identity in model m1: 〈s′|Q |s〉1 = 〈s′| d†S ◦ dQ(Q) ◦ dS |s〉1. Since the state-space is the whole Hilbert
space, S1 = H1, this equation is valid for all s, s′ ∈ H1 (it is also valid for all Q ∈ Q); so it implies that
the operators on the two sides must be equal: d†S ◦ dQ(Q) ◦ dS = Q ⇒ dQ(Q) = dS ◦Q ◦ d†S , as claimed
in the main text.
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map (‘dual’ in the mathematical, not physical, sense). Thus recall that given any map
between two sets f : X → Y , and any map g : Y → Z, the dual (or transpose) g∗ of g
(with respect to f) is defined as the map g∗ : X → Z with g∗(x) := (g ◦ f)(x). Putting
X = Y = S, f = dS , and Z = R, and taking the function g : Y → Z to be the quantity
(as a real-valued function) Q : S → R: this definition of the dual map becomes (with the
bra-ket notation now meaning values of quantities as in Eq. (4)): 〈Q∗, s〉 := 〈Q, dS(s)〉.
But so far, the notation Q∗ does not exhibit its dependence on dS ; (just as g∗ does not
exhibit its dependence on f). So it is clearer to write d∗S(Q) instead of just Q
∗. Thus we
write: 〈d∗S(Q), s〉 := 〈Q, dS(s)〉. Applying this to d−1S : S → S, we deduce that defining
dQ as the dual (d−1S )
∗ of d−1S yields Eq. (9), as desired. That is: we have by the definition
of ‘dual map’ :
〈(d−1S )∗(Q) , dS(s)〉 = 〈(Q ◦ d−1S ), dS(s)〉 = 〈Q, s〉 ; (10)
which is Eq. (9). So like in the quantum case: duality comes down to a single duality
map on states, dS , with dQ being defined as the dual, i.e. transpose, of its inverse d−1S ,
and appropriate equivariance conditions on the dynamics.
We will see in Section 4 that for symmetries instead of dualities, we can similarly
concentrate on a map on states—unsurprisingly, since the basic notion of symmetry is the
preservation of the values of given quantities.
3.2 The road ahead: duality as a ‘giant symmetry’
As discussed in Section 1, we have elsewhere related this Schema to various topics, and
illustrated it with bosonization and some examples from string theory. The job of the
next three Sections is to relate it to symmetries.
As also discussed in Section 1, it is agreed in the literature that a duality is like a ‘giant
symmetry’: a symmetry between theories. The main new ingredient that the Schema adds
to this agreed idea is its picture of two levels, with the bare theory above and the model
roots, the bare theory’s homomorphic copies, below. As we will see, these two levels can
differ in the amount of structure that a map, such as a symmetry, is required to preserve;
and this prompts some distinctions between types of symmetry.
Thus we will proceed in three stages.
(i): We begin with comments about symmetry in general (Section 4). They are re-
gardless of both: (a) there being a duality; and (b) the distinction between a theory
and its representations (homomorphic copies), or more generally its instantiations. These
comments are familiar ground in the philosophy of symmetry: but they are worth making
since they will apply, suitably adjusted, to the rest of the paper.
(ii): Then we discuss, regardless of there being a duality, how a symmetry of a theory
is related to symmetries of its representations (homomorphic copies), or more generally
its instantiations: (Section 5). This will yield the distinctions between types of symmetry.
(iii): Finally, we suppose we have a duality in the sense of the Schema, and relate this
to symmetries. That is: we show that a duality preserves the symmetries of its model
triples (Section 6).
22
4 Symmetries in General
We begin with a usual notion of symmetry: as a map a on states, a : S → S, that
preserves the values of a salient set of quantities: usually a large set, though not necessarily
all the quantities. The map a must also respect the structure of S, e.g. topological or
differential structure. (Thus ‘a’ is for ‘automorphism’.) But this requirement will be in
the background in the sequel: the emphasis will be on the state s and the image-state
a(s) having the same values for quantities in the salient set.
Here, the notion of value is exactly as in the Schema: 〈Q, s〉, understood as a classical
possessed value or a quantum expectation value (or more generally, as a matrix element,
〈s′| Qˆ |s〉 ∈ C: see below). The equality of values, for a symmetry a,
〈Q, a(s)〉 = 〈Q, s〉 (11)
is then analogous to the Schema’s matching of values, under transforming both states and
quantities by the duality maps dS and dQ: cf. Eq. (9). (More generally: as in Section 3,
we take quantum symmetries to also preserve off-diagonal matrix elements:
〈a(s′)| Qˆ |a(s)〉 = 〈s′| Qˆ | s〉 , ∀ s, s′ ∈ S , (12)
for a salient subset of operators in Q, usually including the Hamiltonian. And this con-
dition can be weakened, to hold only for a salient subset of states in S.)
This is of course the reason why the Schema confirms the ‘giant symmetry’ analogy.
So far—i.e. before we focus on the two levels, bare theory above and model roots below—
there are just two disanalogies between symmetry and duality:
(i): Eq. (11) uses the identity map on quantities, while Eq. (9) uses a duality map dQ:
corresponding to the jargon ‘invariance’ vs. ‘covariance’, and our phrase ‘preservation or
matching’ above;
(ii): Eq. (11) typically holds for a salient subset of the quantities, while the duality
condition Eq. (9) holds for all the quantities: this will be illustrated below.
This notion of symmetry is very simple. But suitably adapted and augmented, it will
be sufficient for this paper’s purposes. In this Section, we make four comments about
it. They are regardless of there being a duality; and of the distinction between levels,
i.e. between a bare theory and model roots. So in this Section, we can just think of a
theory as a triple of states, quantities and dynamics: 〈S,Q,D〉. These comments will
apply, suitably adjusted, to the rest of the paper. The first, third and fourth comments
(Sections 4.1, 4.3, and 4.4) are about the notion being adaptable, including to dynamics.
The second comment (Section 4.2) is about the idea of a salient set of quantities.
4.1 Dual maps
We said that a symmetry is a map on states that preserves the values of a salient, usually
large, set of quantities. Agreed, it is also usual to think of a symmetry as a map on
quantities that preserves values on a salient, usually large, set of states: i.e. for a given
state, the value of the argument-quantity equals the value of the image-quantity. Instead
of Eq. (11), one would write a symmetry as a map α : Q → Q with:
〈α(Q), s〉 = 〈Q, s〉. (13)
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But there is no conflict here. The two conceptions are related by duality in mathe-
maticians’ sense, not ours (cf. Section 3.1). That is: one map is the mathematical dual of
the other. Recall that given any map a : S → S, its dual map on quantities, a∗ : Q → Q,
is defined by requiring that for any s ∈ S and Q ∈ Q: 〈a∗(Q), s〉 := 〈Q, a(s)〉. It follows
immediately that if a : S → S is a symmetry in our initial sense, i.e. a respects the
structure of S, and Eq. (11) holds, then the dual map on quantities, a∗ : Q → Q is a
symmetry in the corresponding sense as regards quantities, given by Eq. (13):
〈Q, a(s)〉 = 〈Q, s〉 ⇒ 〈a∗(Q), s〉 := 〈Q, a(s)〉 = 〈Q, s〉. (14)
Besides, while we began with symmetry as a map on states, and conceived symmetries
for quantities as dual maps: one could instead equally well start with quantities. For
again, one defines dual maps in the same way. Given any map α : Q → Q, we say
that its dual map on states, α∗ : S → S, is defined by requiring for all arguments:
〈Q,α∗(s)〉 := 〈α(Q), s〉. One could then define symmetries for quantities by Eq. (13), and
deduce that if α is a symmetry for quantities, its dual map α∗ is a symmetry for states,
i.e. obeys Eq. (11).
Likewise in the quantum case, with preservation of matrix elements for a salient set
of operators. We can define a symmetry α by:
〈s′| Qˆ |s〉 = 〈s′|α(Qˆ) |s〉 , ∀ s, s′ ∈ S . (15)
Again, this condition can be weakened, to hold only for a salient subset of states in S.
Similar manipulations to the ones in the classical case23 give that the symmetry, defined
as a map α on quantities, induces a symmetry, defined as a map a on states, iff the
symmetry map α decomposes in the following way:
α(Qˆ) = a† Qˆ a . (16)
Notice that this correspondence between symmetries α on quantities and symmetries a
on states is not one-to-one. For example, if a commutes with a quantity Q, we can have a
non-trivial symmetry on states that gives rise to a trivial symmetry on quantities (i.e. a
map a that is non-trivial, while α = id is trivial).
4.2 Salient quantities and states: stipulated symmetries
We said that a symmetry preserves values for ‘a salient, usually large, set of quanti-
ties/states’. This general formulation deliberately uses the vague word ‘salient’, since it
varies from case to case which quantities/states it is noteworthy to preserve the values
of. But it is worth noticing three sorts of consideration that often mould the choice of
quantities/states, i.e. which quantities/states count as salient. The first, which we label
23The proof is as follows. Begin with a symmetry a : S → S defined on states, viz. Eq. (12), and
rewrite the left-hand side as: 〈a(s′)| Qˆ |a(s)〉 = 〈s′|a†Qˆ a|s〉. Comparing this with Eq. (15), we see that
this induces a symmetry α, defined on quantities. Namely: α(Qˆ) = a†Qˆ a. And the other way around: if
the map α on quantities decomposes into the left- and right-action of some operator a, then this induces
a symmetry a : S → S on states.
24
stipulated symmetries, gives a contrast with how we have written so far; the second and
third will get a Subsection of their own (Sections 4.3 and 4.4).
So far, we have written as if a theory is always given to us with prescribed sets of states
and of quantities, so that the set of symmetries is thereby fixed, once some precise meaning
of ‘salient’ is fixed. But as we foreshadowed in footnote 6: often in physics, we “begin
our theorizing” with symmetry principles. That is: we define a theory’s sets of states and
quantities in order that they carry a representation of a given abstract symmetry group:
spacetime symmetry groups such as the Poincare´ group being a standard example. In such
a case, we will say the symmetries are stipulated—they are part of the definition of the
theory. Usually, we think of these symmetries as maps on states: unitary representations
of a spacetime symmetry group on a Hilbert space being a standard quantum example.
In general, then, a theory T that is formulated as a triple, 〈S,Q,D〉, is said to have
a stipulated symmetry if it is formulated as having an automorphism of the state-space,
a : S → S, that preserves some salient subset of the quantities. The stipulated symmetry
thus comes with a choice of which quantities count as salient, so that their values are
“worth” preserving. This choice is encoded formally in the definition of the triple and its
stipulated symmetry, and it of course bears on the theory’s interpretation—it moulds the
kinds of interpretations that the theory can be given.
But note that stipulating a symmetry does not imply that every state has its value
preserved for every quantity definable on the state-space. (And mutatis mutandis if we
conceive a symmetry as a map on quantities; cf. Section 4.1 above.) For example, one
might stipulate rotational symmetry: more precisely, that in a quantum theory the Hamil-
tonian is rotationally invariant, so that the Hilbert space carries representations of SO(3).
But this still allows using quantities Q whose expectation values on some states are not
invariant under rotations. Thus even with a stipulated symmetry, there is a question of
selecting the salient quantities. This point will recur in Section 4.3.24
4.3 Dynamical symmetries
We have presented symmetries as maps that preserve the salient quantities’ values (and
respect the structure of S or Q: cf. Section 4.1). But we have not mentioned time, i.e. the
fact that values change over time. It is indeed very usual to define a symmetry as a map
that ‘preserves the dynamics’. Taking a symmetry, as usual, as a map on states, this
means, roughly: if a sequence of states is possible according to the dynamics, so is the
sequence of image-states.
We can make this precise by using the framework for dynamics, in both Schro¨dinger
and Heisenberg pictures, given in Section 2.4, Eqs. (5) and (6). We will favour the former.
(As noted there, a full discussion would also address the treatment of time in theories
24For example, Caulton (2015: p. 156) distinguishes three natural classes, two of which are extreme
and trivialising, while the third is the most interesting: (1) symmetries that preserve all the quantities
Q of a theory: these are required to preserve everything, which means changing nothing; (2) symmetries
that do not preserve any quantities, i.e. the set of all bijections on the state-space S; (3) symmetries
that lie between these extremes are the interesting cases: especially symmetries that preserve the ‘set of
physical quantities, i.e. the quantities that, on the basis of their representing the physical properties and
relations, register physical differences’ (ibid).
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not best thought of as triples, e.g. theories formulated using partition functions; again,
cf. footnote 7.)
On Schro¨dinger dynamics, a dynamically possible total history of the system is a
curve through the state-space S parameterized by time t: with each point s(t) defining
the values 〈Q, s(t)〉 of the various quantities Q at t. Then we can define a dynamical
symmetry as a map a on S that (a) respects S’s structure (b) maps any dynamically
possible history (curve through state-space) to another such history. That is: if s(t) is a
dynamically possible history, the sequence a(s(t)) of states is also dynamically possible.25
On Heisenberg dynamics, the definition of a dynamical symmetry is (we think!) more
complicated, because the representation of a dynamically possible history is more com-
plicated. A history is given by a fixed s ∈ S and a family of curves through Q, all
parameterized by time t: with Q1, Q2 on a common curve representing the same physical
quantity, e.g. energy, at two times t1, t2. So for a single history, there are as many curves
through Q in the family as there are physical quantities pertaining to the system. So
a dynamical symmetry must be a map whose domain is, not Q, but the set of all such
families of curves (or all such families that are indeed dynamically possible, once some
s ∈ S is chosen). So the map will have to suitably respect, not so much Q’s structure,
but the structure Q induces on this set of families of curves. And for the map to be a
dynamical symmetry, it must leave invariant the dynamically possible families (allowing,
no doubt, for a change of state s ∈ S). But in this paper, we can focus on symmetries as
maps on states, and so we will not need to further consider the Heisenberg picture.
Given this definition of dynamical symmetry in Schro¨dinger picture, as a map on S
that commutes with the dynamics (footnote 25), the obvious first question is: how is this
related to our initial idea of symmetry as a map on S that preserves quantities’ values,
regardless of time?
A priori, they seem very different. Indeed the notion of dynamical symmetry seems
weaker in that it requires the transform a(s(t)) of each dynamically possible history s(t)
‘only’ to be itself dynamically possible—it need not have any distinctive relation to s(t),
e.g. by being in some sense a ‘replica’ of s(t). But in fact the notions are drawn together
by dynamical symmetry’s requirement that the map on histories be induced by a map on
states. That is: writing a history as a set of points in S for brevity, {s(t)}: a dynamical
symmetry requires that the map on histories {s(t)} 7→ {s′(t)} be induced by a map on
instantaneous states, i.e. s(t) 7→ a(s(t)). This turns out to be a strong requirement,
thanks to the ‘sensitivity’ of dynamics to the values of many quantities. That is: it turns
out to force a to preserve the values of many quantities—leading us back to our initial
idea of symmetry. But note that this implication is not a priori: it depends on what
dynamical evolution, in typical theories, in fact depends on.
The point here is well illustrated by spacetime symmetries, as mentioned in Section
4.2. Take for example, spatial translation or spatial rotation in Euclidean space R3;
and consider any of Newtonian mechanics, relativistic mechanics, quantum mechanics, or
indeed their ‘cousin’ field theories. Each of these is of course a framework for theorising:
25Preserving the dynamics in this sense is of course a commutation i.e. equivariance condition. For
if we write s(t) = Dt,t0(s(t0)) with Dt,t0 representing the dynamics (cf. eq 5), then preservation of the
dynamics is: a(s(t)) ≡ a(Dt,t0(s(t0))) = Dt,t0(a(s(t0))).
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not a specific theory, with specific particle and-or field contents, and their dynamics
(equations of motion). But it turns out that most such specific theories that have been
empirically successful,26 once set in Euclidean space R3, do have spatial translations and
spatial rotations as dynamical symmetries. And since a dynamical symmetry is to be
induced by a single map a on instantaneous states, e.g. by spatial translation of 1 mile due
East applied to every state, the transform a(s(t)) of each dynamically possible history s(t)
will indeed be a ‘replica’ of s(t), e.g. spatially translated by 1 mile. Besides, the dynamics
is ‘sensitive’ to the values of many quantities, in the sense that a dynamical symmetry
must not alter them: so its map a on instantaneous states is indeed a symmetry a` la our
initial idea. Again, spatial translations and spatial rotations give a standard illustration;
as follows. As we said, most of the empirically successful specific theories written in
any of the above frameworks, and set in Euclidean space R3, have these as dynamical
symmetries. But they “don’t allow squeezing”! That is, a dynamical symmetry a must
preserve all the relative distances, and relative velocities, between the constituents of the
system: if a is, or includes, a spatial translations or rotation, it must be a rigid one, of
the system as a whole. It must preserve the values of many quantities—the relative ones.
This discussion of a dynamical symmetry leads in to Section 4.4. Also, the cautionary
note at the end of Section 4.2 above applies again. That is: stipulating that a symmetry
be dynamical—indeed, stipulating more specifically: both a symmetry and a dynamics
it respects—does not imply that every state has its value preserved for every quantity
definable on the state-space. Again, the example of SO(3) in quantum theory suffices.
One might stipulate that SO(3) be a symmetry, and that the Hamiltonian be SO(3)-
invariant (i.e. in obvious notation: [H,UR] = 0 for all R ∈ SO(3)). This does not imply
that one can only use quantities Q that are rotationally invariant (i.e. [Q,UR] = 0).
4.4 Spacetime theories and their symmetries
In philosophical and foundational discussions of spacetime theories, it is usual to define
symmetries in an apparently different way from ours.
Besides, it is usual to define such theories, not as a triple 〈S,Q,D〉 as we have done,
but as a set of, so to speak, possible universes. That is: as a set of n-tuples, consisting
of a spacetime manifold M , equipped with both chrono-geometric structure (encoded in
a metric field, a connection etc.) and matter fields (encoded in tensor and spinor fields
obeying equations of motion). Each such n-tuple represents a (total, 4-dimensional) solu-
tion of the theory: a ‘possible universe’.27 A symmetry is then usually defined along the
following lines. (Recall the example of Galilean transformations in Section 2.3.2.) It is a
bijection of the manifold that:
(a) respects its topological and differential structure (technically: is a diffeo-
morphism); and whose induced maps on tensor fields, connections etc.:
(b) fix the chrono-geometric structure (i.e. maps the metric field, connection
26‘Successful’ within limits, of course: for example, relative velocities small compared with c for Newto-
nian mechanics to be successful, and typical actions large compared with h for Newtonian or relativistic
mechanics to be successful.
27So these n-tuples are usually called ‘dynamically possible models’ of the theory: but we will resist
yet another use of the over-worked word ‘model’ !
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etc. into themselves) and also
(c) send the matter fields into another solution of the equations of motion—
another sequence of values over time that is dynamically allowed/possible.
So we need to link our construal of a theory as a triple, and of a symmetry as a map
on a state-space, to these ideas. The main link is of course that while a physical theory
usually has as its subject-matter some limited kind of system, for which we think of the
instantaneous state (values of quantities) changing over time, a spacetime theory takes
the universe-throughout-all-time as its subject-matter. So in our construal, a dynamically
possible total history of the system is, on Schro¨dinger picture dynamics, as discussed in
Section 4.3: a curve through S parameterized by time t, with each point s(t) defining the
values 〈Q, s(t)〉 of the various quantities Q at t.28 But in a spacetime theory, a dynamically
allowed/possible total history of the system is just an n-tuple.
One natural way to link to our construal is to make a space-vs.-time split within the
spacetime theory’s manifold.29 That is: we take the spacetime theory to have:
[a] a state-space S of the instantaneous states of a notional 3-manifold Σ, which
we take as a fiducial spacelike slice of the spacetime manifold;
[b] a set of quantities Q defined on Σ (local densities of matter fields etc.); and
[c] a dynamics D determining the evolution of the instantaneous state of Σ.
Then a dynamically possible total history is a foliation of spacetime, whose leaves are time-
evolutes of Σ, equipped with fields. In other words: it is a curve through S parameterized
by a time t labelling the leaves of the foliation.
Combining [a]-[c] with our discussion of dynamical symmetries in Section 4.3, we can
now see that our initial simple idea of a symmetry, as a map a on the system’s state-space
S that respects its structure and preserves the values of a salient set of quantities, is,
after all, similar to the usual definition of symmetry for spacetime theories, (a)-(c) above.
For making the space-vs.-time split, [a]-[c], renders this usual definition of symmetry,
(a)-(c), like Section 4.3’s definition of dynamical symmetry. Indeed, most of the familiar
(and empirically successful) theories set in the framework of Newtonian mechanics, or
relativistic mechanics or quantum mechanics (or their ‘cousin’ field theories) mentioned
in Section 4.3 can be written down as spacetime theories, i.e. as postulating a spacetime
manifold equipped with chrono-geometric structure and matter fields: with the different
notions of symmetry being linked by using a space-vs.-time split.
There are of course several issues here, about which much more could be said. Among
them are:
28As in Section 4.3 , one can have a corresponding discussion using the Heisenberg picture. But here,
we set this aside.
29An alternative way to link to the usual covariant formulations of spacetime theories takes a model
of T to have as its state-space the set of all admissible spacetimes that are solutions of the theory’s
dynamical equations (e.g. in general relativity, the Einstein equations). But adopting either of these
ways, here and in the main text, one faces issues, if a state is a whole spacetime, about how to “get inside
a spacetime”, so as to distinguish a quantity’s differing values at different spacetime points. Thus one
widely adopted approach is to associate quantities not with points, but with extended regions of different
types, i.e. one gets ‘quasi-local quantities’: see Penrose (1988) and Brown and York (1993); for reviews,
see Wang (2015) and Szabados (2009). There are also other issues about which much could be said, such
as: rigorously defining quasi-local quantities; fixed fields; the definition of diffeomorphism invariance and
its interplay with boundary conditions. (See for example Pooley (2017: p. 117) and De Haro (2017)).
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(i) the interplay of the structures (topological, differential, metrical etc.) of physical
space, spacetime, and state-space;
(ii) the justification for singling out, in the spacetime definition of symmetry, the
chrono-geometric structure of the manifold as having to be fixed (requirement (b)), while
the matter fields need not be (especially in the context of general relativity); and
(iii) the justification for making the space-vs.-time split, especially in the context
of relativity theory (especially general relativity: cf. footnote 29).
And of course, such issues are mutually related. For example, (i) and (ii): one might argue
that the requirement (b), to fix the chrono-geometric structure, reflects the requirement
in our initial idea of symmetry, that a must respect the structure of the state-space S,
and the fact that S’s structure is largely determined by the chrono-geometric structure
of spacetime. However, for this paper we will not need to explore these issues: sufficient
unto the day ...
5 Symmetries of Theories and of Models
We now combine the ideas of Section 4 with Section 3’s distinction between a bare theory
T and its models in our sense, viz. representations of T , each with a specific structure
of its own. Our notation distinguishes the model’s representation of the bare theory’s
triple, from its specific structure M¯ . It gives a subscript M to the former to signal that
it is built out of the latter: M = 〈SM ,QM ,DM ; M¯〉. Cf. Eq. (1). We also wrote this as
M =: 〈m; M¯〉 , where m := TM := 〈SM ,QM ,DM〉 is the model triple.
As we announced in the prospectus (Section 3.2), the differing amounts of structure
at the two levels, bare theory and model, prompt some distinctions, and some definitions
of types of symmetry.
We will begin with the idea of symmetries of a theory that are implemented in all the
models, which leads to the idea of stipulated symmetries (Section 5.1). Then we consider
symmetries that fail to be implemented in some of the models, which leads to the idea
of accidental symmetries (Section 5.2). We will see that this failure can happen for two
diverse reasons. Roughly speaking: either the theory’s homomorphic copy has “lost the
structure with which to exhibit the symmetry”, or the model has “extra structure that
blocks the symmetry”.
Then in Section 5.3, we will discuss cases where the specific structure in a model has a
symmetry that is “invisible” in the weaker structure of the model triple (the homomorphic
copy of the bare theory). Here, ‘invisible’ will mean, roughly speaking: ‘cannot be defined,
or reduces to the trivial symmetry, i.e. the identity map’. We call such a symmetry a
proper symmetry of the model. Note that these cases yield a contrast with the other, more
common, usage of ‘model’ as an individual solution of a theory. On that usage, a model
is in general less symmetric than its theory—as is often remarked, with the buzz-word
‘symmetry-breaking’. A solution of a dynamics with a spherically symmetric Hamiltonian
need not be spherically symmetric; a cubical crystal lattice with one particular placing
of its lattice points, and one particular orientation of its edges, can be a solution of a
dynamics that is translation-invariant and isotropic; and so on. So beware: our cases of
proper symmetries of a model are cases ‘lying in the opposite direction’ from what one
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S a−−→ Syh yh
SM aM−−→ SM
Figure 3: Commutativity diagram of the symmetry a with the representation map h.
expects from the other, more common, usage of ‘model’.
Finally, Section 5.4 will sum up the Section. It emphasises that these three types
of symmetry are mutually exclusive. (It also mentions a fourth type: which will not be
important, but which completes our classification, i.e. makes the four types exhaustive.)
This Section builds on Section 4. For in this Section:
(i): we will again take a symmetry as a map a on states, though we could equally
well take it as a map on quantities;
(ii): we will return to the idea of stipulated symmetries; and
(iii): one can, at each stage of the discussion, require the symmetry to be a dy-
namical symmetry; but we will not explicitly mention this;
and these three points echo Sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, respectively.
5.1 Guaranteeing that a bare theory’s symmetry is implemented
in a model: stipulated symmetries
For any theory T and any of its models M , there is a natural condition for a symmetry of
T to be itself realized in M : for it to have, so to speak, a “shadow” in the model M . It is
that an obvious diagram should commute (cf. Figure 3). Here, we write representation as
a map h (‘h’ for homomorphism). So treating symmetries as maps on states: a symmetry
of T = 〈S,Q,D〉 is a map a : S → S that preserves the value of all quantities in a salient
subset of the quantities Q. So we take h as an appropriate structure-preserving map: from
S in the theory T itself, to SM in the representing model triple m = TM = 〈SM ,QM ,DM〉.
Then the condition—that the symmetry a is itself realized in M—is that there should be
a map aM : SM → SM , such that the diagram in Figure 3 commutes.
But this condition is not automatic: even in simple cases, like elementary group theory.
In Section 5.2 we will discuss how the condition can fail: here we consider ways to secure
it.
There are two obvious ways to do so: i.e. ways to secure that a bare theory’s symmetry
is implemented in a model of it. The first is a formal triviality; the second is a stipulation.
First: consider the case where the model triple is isomorphic to the bare theory. (In the
language of representation theory: the representation is faithful, i.e. the homomorphism
has trivial kernel.) With the map h an isomorphism, the map aM is bound to exist; and
the diagram in Figure 4 will trivially commute. In this case, a symmetry of the theory
has a “duplicate” or “replica” (not just a “shadow”) in the symmetries of the model—so
that in effect, the symmetries of the theory are a subset of the symmetries of the model.
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We say ‘in effect’ just because of the different domains of definition: S vs. SM .
Second: consider, so to speak, the power of stipulation. That is: recall the idea of
stipulated symmetries, as in Section 4.2. The idea there was that often in physics, we “be-
gin with”, i.e. are guided by, symmetry principles, and therefore require the state-space of
our theory to carry a representation of a group, with values of the salient quantities being
preserved under the action of the (representation’s) group elements. One standard exam-
ple is requiring the states, of whatever type of particle or field, to carry a representation
of a spacetime symmetry group, such as the Poincare´ or Galilean group.
Carrying this idea over to our two levels, of bare theory and models: it means requiring
each model triple to have a symmetry that is a shadow of the bare theory’s symmetry.
In terms of symmetries as maps on states: each model triple is simply required to have
a symmetry aM on SM that makes Figure 3 commute. In short: one has commutation
by stipulation. We shall call such symmetries—both a on the bare theory that ‘does the
requiring’, and the ‘required’ aM on the model M—stipulated symmetries. And similarly
for a whole group of symmetries. And again, a spacetime symmetry group gives a standard
example.
This second idea can be implemented in practice as follows: (i) Stipulate the symme-
tries to be part of the definition of the bare theory, T (cf. footnote 6). (ii) Reduce the
set of models to only those models that instantiate the symmetry, i.e. those for which the
diagram in Figure 3 commutes. Here, (i) implies (ii).
Thus, for a field theory based on the homogeneous Lorentz group, one can system-
atically construct the fields by looking at the irreducible representations of this group.30
Thus we begin (cf. Weinberg (1995: Chapters 5.2-5.6)) with the trivial representation of
the Lorentz group, which gives a massive scalar field. The next (in terms of its dimension)
irreducible representation is the Dirac spinor representation describing a fermion. The
next irreducible representation is the (massive) vector representation, i.e. a four-vector
(which contains spin zero and spin one states); and we can have various tensor represen-
tations, etc.
Often, in practice, and in particular for spacetime symmetry groups: these two ways
to secure the commutation—to secure that a bare theory’s symmetry is implemented—
come together. For the stipulation made is not just that the state-space of the model
triple carry a symmetry, or carry some or other representation of a group of symmetries.
It is also stipulated that it carry a faithful representation of the group. That is: the
representation map h is required to be an isomorphism. So the upshot is: a symmetry of
the bare theory has a duplicate or replica (not just a shadow) in the symmetries of each
model (but of course represented differently in the theory and in each of the models)—so
that in effect, the stipulated symmetries of the theory are a subset of the symmetries of
the models.31
30For textbooks on quantum field theory that take this approach from their very first pages, see
Weinberg (1995: Chapters 2.4-2.7, 5) and Maggiore (2005: Chapter 2).
31Again, we say ‘in effect’ just because of the different domains of definition: S vs. SM . And as
mentioned in this Section’s preamble: note the contrast with the other, more common, meaning of
‘model’ as an individual solution of a theory. On that meaning, a model is in general less symmetric than
its theory.
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G1
a1−−→ G1yh yh
G2
a2−−→ G2
Figure 4: Commutativity of group automorphism a1 with group homomorphism h.
5.2 A bare theory’s symmetry might fail to be implemented in
a model: accidental symmetries
As we said at the start of Section 5.1, Figure 3 need not commute—even in simple cases,
like elementary group theory. In fact, the condition can fail in either of two ways: because
the theory’s homomorphic copy has “lost the structure with which to exhibit the sym-
metry”; or because the model has “extra structure that blocks the symmetry”. We will
give an example of each of these: the first from group theory, the second from elementary
spacetime theory.
So first, let the bare theory be just a group G1,
32 with an automorphism a1 : G1 → G1;
and suppose a group G2 represents G1 thanks to the existence of a homomorphism h :
G1 → G2. So G2 ∼= G1/kerh. Then for there to be a homomorphism of G2, a2 : G2 → G2
(even homomorphism: let alone automorphism), that realizes a1 (counts as a1’s “shadow”
in G2) requires commutation: i.e. for all g1 ∈ G1, h(a1(g1)) = a2(h(g1)). Or as a diagram,
see: Figure 4. But a1 and h need not mesh in this way: commutation of the diagram is not
guaranteed. The smallest counterexample we have found is presented in the Appendix.
A second example of a theory’s symmetry failing to exist at the level of its models is
given by Section 2.3.2’s neo-Newtonian spacetime as a bare theory, modelled by various
Newtonian spacetimes each with their own specification of absolute rest. Here it is “extra
structure in the models” that blocks the implementation of the theory’s symmetry. Thus
we take neo-Newtonian spacetime to be so defined that the Galilean group is its symmetry
group: i.e. the set of diffeomorphisms of the spacetime that fix the spatial metric (giving
Euclidean geometry in the instantaneous slices), the temporal 1-form (ordering the slices
like R), and the flat affine connection (giving a notion of absolute acceleration, without
a notion of absolute rest or absolute velocity). (Cf. Section 4.4.) Thanks to avoiding an
absolute rest, the boosts are symmetries. But in a Newtonian spacetime, with the extra
structure of a specified absolute rest, the boosts are not symmetries: the symmetry group
is reduced to the Euclidean group (i.e. rotations and spatial translations) combined with
time translations. In our jargon, whereby a model comprises specific structure as well as
a model triple: the specific structure prevents the symmetry.
Accidental symmetries:— We have seen that, in general, the symmetries of a theory
are not instantiated in its models. But this of course does not forbid special situations
32To be a bare theory in our sense, we would need to add a set of maps to the real numbers, to express
evaluation of the quantities, and even a dynamics. But to give the simplest case, we ignore these maps.
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in which a theory happens to have symmetries that are not stipulated (they are not part
of the definition of the bare theory). And these symmetries may (though of course they
need not) have “shadows” in some (but not all) of their models. This is the situation
where the diagram in Figure 3, for a specific model M , commutes “for free”, i.e. without
the symmetry a being part of the definition of the bare theory T . We call these accidental
symmetries.
To illustrate the practical usefulness of the notion of accidental symmetries, we now
give a very simple example that we will generalise in the next Section. Consider the bare
quantum theory of the hydrogen atom, with a Hamiltonian that only contains a kinetic
term for the electron, and a potential that only contains the Coulomb attraction, i.e. the
basic textbook example of the hydrogen atom, neglecting all other interactions. Thus
the states of our theory are square-integrable wave-functions, the quantities are the set
of operators of the hydrogen atom (in particular the Hamiltonian), and the dynamics
is the Schro¨dinger equation (thus we adopt the Schro¨dinger picture). This theory has
many models, in our logically weak sense of ‘model’ from Section 2.1.1. Indeed, each
square-integrable wave-function that solves the Schro¨dinger equation with given initial
conditions (along with the set of operators that act on it, and its time evolution) is a
representation of the theory—even if a very non-faithful representation.33 Let us call
these models Mn`m, where n, `,m are the quantum numbers of the hydrogen atom.
34 But
the set of all such models, i.e. the set of all square-integrable wave-functions that solve
the Schro¨dinger equation, is itself also a model. Let us call this model Mtotal := {Mn`m},
where n, `,m have the usual ranges.
Let us now discuss the spherical symmetry of this bare theory of the hydrogen atom.
Particular solutions (except for special, spherically symmetric, solutions) are of course
not spherically symmetric. Thus, most of the individual models Mn`m do not enjoy the
SO(3) symmetry of the theory (although they are mapped into each other by the action
of SO(3)). On the other hand, Mtotal does carry non-trivial representations of SO(3),
which acts as an automorphism of the set of states. Namely, SO(3) maps states with the
same n and ` but different values of m, so that ` labels the distinct representations of
SO(3) (and, by focussing on a suitable set of eigenfunctions of the Laplacian that form
a complete set, one can get the irreducible representations). In other words, SO(3) is a
symmetry of Mtotal. Of course, all of the above generalises to the case where the potential
is specified only to be a spherically symmetric function, i.e. of the form V (r), and we
consider other spatial dimensions: as we will do in the next Section.
Thus rotational symmetry is an accidental symmetry of this particular theory. It is
a symmetry of the theory that is represented non-trivially in one of the models of the
theory, but not in all the models.
33This recovers the usual meaning of ‘model’, (i) in Section 2.1.1, as a special case of ‘model’, in our
sense. Cf. footnote 4.
34Since each state is determined by a set of initial conditions, it is in general not the case that only
states with fixed values of n, `,m are allowed. The general allowed state is a linear combination of these,
depending on the boundary conditions. But for notational simplicity, we label the models by quantum
numbers.
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5.3 Proper symmetries of models
In the last two Sections, we considered symmetries of a theory that are stipulated to be
symmetries of all the models (Section 5.1) or that fail to be realized in at least some of
the models (Section 5.2). In this Section, we consider symmetries that are not defined
in the theory, but that are nevertheless symmetries of a model. For a model’s specific
structure M¯—its ‘content’ that goes beyond its being a model/realization of T—can make
the model have symmetries additional to those that are “shadows”, or even “duplicates”,
of the symmetries of T . And we expect that if these additional symmetries are well-
defined on the model triple, or if they naturally induce a symmetry there, that symmetry
is trivial, i.e. just the identity map on the model triple.
Our prototypical cases of representations of a group or algebra give examples. Perhaps
the simplest is as follows. Let T be the real numbers R; and let M be the complex
numbers C which of course represents R as the real axis, i.e. the complex numbers with
zero imaginary part, {z ∈ C | z = x + i0, x ∈ R}. So this latter set, the real axis, is
like the model triple. Then M has the symmetry of complex conjugation z 7→ z¯ which is
indeed well-defined on the real axis: but there, it is just the identity map.35
This prompts the idea of a proper symmetry of a model: where the word ‘proper’ is
to connote ‘specific to the model’. The idea is that such a symmetry depends, at least
in part, on the model’s specific structure—which, recall, “lies beyond” the model triple’s
representing the bare theory: just like complex conjugation in the example just given.
To give a general definition, it is clearest to introduce another notation for a model,
as a triple of its own set of states, quantities and dynamics. So we write: M = 〈S¯, Q¯, D¯〉.
Contrast the way our previous notation in Eq. (1) separated out the specific structure
M¯ . Thus we wrote: M = 〈SM ,QM ,DM ; M¯〉 = 〈m; M¯〉. With the new notation, we
can discuss ‘symmetry of a model’ in just the same way that, already in Section 4, we
discussed ‘symmetry of a theory’: namely, as a map a on the state-space S¯ that preserves
the values of a salient, usually large, set of quantities.
This suggests the following definition. Given a (bare) theory T that is represented
by various models and presented as a triple, we will say that a symmetry a of one such
model M = 〈S¯, Q¯, D¯〉, a : S¯ → S¯, is a proper symmetry of M , if there is some other
model of T , say M ′ = 〈S¯ ′, Q¯′, D¯′〉 for which, in effect, a cannot be defined; and a can, in
effect, also not be defined for the theory T . (Here, we say ‘in effect’ for the same reason
as in Section 5.1: i.e. just because of the different domains of definition: S¯ vs. S¯ ′.) More
precisely: in the model M ′ = 〈S¯ ′, Q¯′, D¯′〉, there is no natural definition of a symmetry
map a′ : S¯ ′ → S¯ ′ that is a “cousin” of a, except perhaps as the identity map.
Again, the complex numbers vs. the real numbers give what is perhaps the simplest
35There are also examples in interesting cases of dualities. In gauge-gravity dualities, De Haro (2017)
showed that a certain subgroup of the diffeomorphism group of the gravity model of the theory (roughly,
the diffeomorphisms which preserve the asymptotic boundary conditions) was ‘invisible’ to the gauge
model of the theory, in the sense of not representing any difference on that model: and so these dif-
feomorphisms are not in the common core between the two models, and they are trivially represented
on the bare theory. The same verdict was made in De Haro (2016a: §2.2.3) for the ‘gauge symmetries’
of the gauge side of the duality. These are not visible on the gravity side: they are symmetries of the
formulation of the gauge model of the theory, and are trivially represented on the bare theory.
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example, with the real line now taken as another model M ′ := R, along with the complex
plane M := C: rather than R being the theory T . In this example, complex conjugation
is a proper symmetry of M := C: it reduces to the identity map on the other model,
M ′ := R.
Consider again the example from the previous Section, but in generalised form. We
stipulate that our bare theory is the quantum mechanics of the abstract two-body problem
in an arbitrary number of spatial dimensions. Consider now models that specify:
(i) the number of spatial dimensions, n, and the idealization that one body is a test-
body, which secures rotational invariance, and so an SO(n) symmetry; and
(ii) the form of the potential.
Specifically, we will take the model to specify the dimension of space to be 3, and
the potential to be the Coulomb potential. With these definitions, the SO(3) rotational
symmetry is not a symmetry of the bare theory but it is a symmetry of the model.
Furthermore, the model’s specifying the potential to decay like 1/r means that the SO(3)
symmetry is enlarged to SO(4), where the additional symmetry corresponds to a new
conserved quantity—the Runge-Lentz vector.36 On the other hand, notice that there are
countless other choices of potential that do not share the SO(4) symmetry. Thus, in fact,
this model has an SO(4) symmetry that the bare theory and countless other models do
not share: it is a proper symmetry of this model.
5.4 Kinds of symmetry
Let us sum up this Section’s discussion of how the symmetries of a bare theory relate to
those of its models. We have made two main points, as follows.
(i): A bare theory T is represented by one of its model triples, m. The model M
then consists of m and some specific structure M¯ ; (cf. Section 2). But representation
requires only a homomorphism, not an isomorphism. Hence our articulating in Sections
5.1 and 5.2 the condition—in terms of a commuting diagram—for a symmetry of T to
be itself realized in m. As Section 5.2 described, this condition can fail. So when this
condition is met for some of the models—not by stipulation but “accidentally”—we say
that there is an accidental symmetry.
(ii): When the diagram is stipulated to commute, so that each model has a ‘du-
plicate’ or ‘replica’ of the symmetry a, we have a stipulated symmetry. There are two
obvious ways to implement this stipulation: defining the theory to have a symmetry, and
accordingly restricting the set of models to those that respect the symmetry, or requiring
the model triples to be isomorphic to the theory T (the latter condition being strictly
stronger). But even in such cases, the model (as against the model triple) has its own
specific structure M¯—which may have symmetries that m, and the other models “know
nothing of”: these are proper symmetries of the model (Section 5.3).
36Recall that the rotational invariance of the Hamiltonian implies the conservation of angular momen-
tum, which means that the classical orbits lie on a plane. Likewise, the SO(4) symmetry implies the
conservation of the Runge-Lenz vector, namely M := (p×L−L×p)/2m− e2r/r: i.e. it commutes with
the Hamiltonian.
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We can also now see that our three types of symmetry are mutually exclusive. Stip-
ulated symmetries and accidental symmetries are mutually exclusive because the former
are stipulated while the latter are not; and stipulated symmetries and proper symmetries
of models are mutually exclusive because, while the former has a shadow (i.e. can be
defined as a symmetry) in all of the models, the latter cannot be defined in at least some
models (and it is also not defined in the theory).
Accidental symmetries and proper symmetries are mutually exclusive because an ac-
cidental symmetry is a symmetry of the theory (although it is not stipulated); while a
symmetry of the theory cannot be a proper symmetry of a model.
The only possibility that is not covered by the above three kinds of symmetries is the
possibility that a symmetry is a symmetry of all the models but is not a symmetry of
the theory. Such a symmetry can for example be obtained when a proper symmetry of
the models is shared by some models (but of course not all), and then the models for
which this symmetry is not realized are excised from the set of models. We could call
such a symmetry an improper symmetry of the models (improper, in the sense that it is a
symmetry of all the models but not of the theory).
Indeed, it is now true that any symmetry (in our sense) belongs to one of these four
categories. For, given a theory and a set of models, a symmetry can either be a symmetry
of the theory and of all the models (hence it is stipulated); or it is a symmetry of all the
models but not the theory (an improper symmetry); or it is a symmetry of the theory
and of only some models (an accidental symmetry); or it is a symmetry of some models
but not of the theory and not of some other models (a proper symmetry of the models);
or it is only a symmetry of the theory (also an accidental symmetry).
6 Duality Preserves Symmetries
It is straightforward to confirm that on Section 3.1’s definition of duality, a duality pre-
serves any symmetry (including dynamical symmetries) of its model triples. There are
two points here. First: there is a commuting square diagram of isomorphisms. Second:
there is the issue of the values of a quantity being equal on a given state, and on its
transform under a symmetry. The first point will lead in to the second.
First: The duality maps dS , dQ are not only bijections, but isomorphisms: dS : SM1 →
SM2 , and dQ : QM1 → QM2 . And although we did not have to spell out the exact structures
of SMi ,QMi that these isomorphisms are to preserve, it is obvious from the fact that ‘is
isomorphic to’ is both a symmetric and a transitive relation, that the following diagram,
with a understood to be any automorphism of SM1 , commutes (cf. Figure 5).
And of course, this diagram of isomorphisms is just what we mean by saying a duality
d preserves an automorphism of the state-space SM1 in its domain model triple, and
preserves SM1 ’s structure. Namely, d carries the automorphism—a map a on SM1—to a
corresponding automorphism of states in the codomain (indeed: range) model triple. The
diagram defines this corresponding automorphism, i.e. the map forming the fourth side
of the square: dS ◦ a ◦ (dS)−1 : SM2 → SM2 .
There is obviously a corresponding point about quantities, as against states. Since
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SM1 a−−→ SM1ydS ydS
SM2 −−→ SM2
Figure 5: Commutativity of duality and symmetry for states.
QM1 a−−→ QM1ydQ ydQ
QM2 −−→ QM2
Figure 6: Commutativity of duality and symmetry for quantities.
dQ is required to be an isomorphism of quantities, the following diagram, with a now
understood to be any automorphism of QM1 , must commute, cf. Figure 6.
And again, this diagram is just what we mean by saying a duality d preserves an
automorphism of the quantities in its domain model triple, and preserves QM1 ’s structure.
Namely, d carries the automorphism—a map a onQM1—to a corresponding automorphism
of quantities in the codomain (indeed: range) model triple. The diagram defines this
corresponding automorphism: dQ ◦ a ◦ (dQ)−1 : QM2 → QM2 .
In short: Figures 5 and 6 show that duality commutes with automorphisms of the
states and of the quantities.
Second: But in physics, the notion of symmetry of course involves more than the
notions of automorphism of the state-space, and of the set (usually algebra) of quantities.
It involves the pairing whereby states s and quantities Q assign each other a value: 〈Q, s〉.
For these values (for a large and salient set of quantities) must be preserved under the
symmetry.
But satisfying this is automatic, for a duality as defined in Section 3.1. That is: For
a duality to respect this aspect of symmetry was already built in to our definition of
duality: namely in condition (i), that the values are equal between states and quantities
that correspond by the duality. Recall Eq. (9)), which we here repeat:
〈Q1, s1〉1 = 〈dQ(Q1), dS(s1)〉2 , ∀Q1 ∈ QM1 , s1 ∈ SM1 . (17)
Thus let us show that the map a2 := dS ◦ a ◦ (dS)−1 : SM2 → SM2 is a symmetry
on states in our sense, i.e. preserves values; cf. Figure 5. (A similar argument works
for the symmetry on quantities, as in Figure 6.) In effect, we just use the duality maps
and Eq. (17) to carry back the discussion of preservation of values to the automorphism
a : SM1 → SM1 in model M1. Thus we consider 〈Q2, s2〉2, and we write Q1, s1 for the
inverse images, under dQ and dS respectively, of Q2, s2. Then we have (using Eq. (17) for
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SM1 a−−→ SM1yDt,t0 yDt,t0
SM1 a−−→ SM1
Figure 7: Commutativity of symmetry and dynamics.
SM2 −→ SM2yd−1S yd−1S
SM1 a−−→ SM1yDt,t0 yDt,t0
SM1 a−−→ SM1ydS ydS
SM2 −→ SM2
Figure 8: Commutativity of duality, symmetry, and dynamics.
the second and fourth equations, and a being a symmetry for the third equation):
〈Q2, s2〉2 = 〈dQ(Q1), dS(s1)〉2 = 〈Q1, s1〉1 = 〈Q1, a(s1)〉1 (18)
= 〈dQ(Q1), dS(a(s1))〉2 = 〈Q2, a2(dS(s1))〉2 ≡ 〈Q2, a2(s2)〉2 .
Finally: the same verdict—that a duality preserves any symmetry of its model triples—
applies to dynamics, i.e. to dynamical symmetries. Recall from footnote 25 (in Section
4.3) that a dynamical symmetry is a commutation i.e. equivariance condition. So for the
Schro¨dinger picture of dynamics, the diagram for the ‘first’ side of a duality, i.e. m1 =
〈SM1 ,QM1 ,DM1〉, is, with a the dynamical symmetry, as in Figure 7.
So we now compose this diagram with Figure 5, which represents that a duality pre-
serves a symmetry. But since in Figure 7, the ‘first’ side, ‘1’, of the duality occurs twice,
on both top and bottom rows, we now need to compose Figure 7 with Figure 5 twice: both
on its bottom row; and also on its top row (with the duality arrow in Figure 5 reversed).
The resulting diagram (Figure 8) shows that the duality isomorphism on state-spaces dS
carries the dynamical symmetry a on the ‘1’ side of the duality, to a dynamical symmetry
on the ‘2’ side: namely, the symmetry dS ◦ a ◦ d−1s (cf. either the top or bottom square).
The Schro¨dinger picture dynamics on SM2 is (reading down the columns in the Figure):
dS ◦Dt,t0 ◦ d−1S .
To sum up: we have shown that a duality always preserves a symmetry of its model
triples.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated the relations between dualities and symmetries, using
our Schema for dualities. The Schema begins with a conception of theories and of models
that is widespread in philosophy of science (namely, a theory as a formal structure or a set
of axioms, and models as instantiations or representations of the theory) but that departs
from the common usage, in philosophy of physics, of models as individual solutions of the
theory’s dynamical equations. The flexibility in our usage allows both a natural definition
of a duality as an isomorphism between models and the recovery, as a special case, of the
more familiar notion of ‘model’ in philosophy of physics: by appropriately tuning the level
of the description—more precisely, by carefully selecting the relevant representations.
In Section 2, we emphasised (i) the distinction within a model (in our sense, viz.
representation of a bare theory), between model root and specific structure; and (ii) the
distinction between internal and external interpretations. This gave us a clear formulation
of disagreements like those between Newton (Clarke) and Leibniz, about the status of
absolute rest: which we illustrated with Galilean transformations. We also used matrix
representations of a group to illustrate the different ways one can define ‘model root’ and
‘specific structure’.
The distinction (i) also underpins the Schema’s exact definition of duality as an iso-
morphism of model roots (Section 3). This equipped us, after reviewing symmetries in
general (Section 4), to understand in detail how dualities and symmetries relate to one
another.
This we undertook in the last two Sections. In Section 5, the Schema’s conceptions
of theory and model prompted us to introduce four types of symmetries: of which two
are symmetries of the theory (stipulated symmetries and accidental symmetries) and two
are symmetries of models only (proper and improper symmetries). These four types are
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive of all the possibilities for symmetries, given the
Schema’s distinction between theory and models, and our construal of ‘symmetry’. Then
in Section 6 we showed that, just as one would hope, the Schema’s construal of duality
meshes with whatever symmetries the duals, i.e. the isomorphic model roots, may have.
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Appendix. A Group Automorphism Lost under Ho-
momorphism
We present a simple case of Section 5.2’s topic, of a symmetry of a theory being “lost” in
a model. As discussed in Section 5.2: for the simple case of group theory, this is a matter
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of the diagram in Figure 4 not commuting. That is: an automorphism a1 : G1 → G1, and
a homomorphism h : G1 → G2 ∼= G1/kerh need not mesh as the diagram shows, so as to
give a well-defined homomorphism a2 : G2 → G2.
To see what is involved, we can identify G2 with its isomorph G1/kerh; and let us
write K as short for kerh. Then the commutation requirement h(a1(g1)) = a2(h(g1)) is
the requirement that the definition of a2 by saying a2(Kg1) := h(a1(g1)) be well-defined.
That is: the given automorphism a1 must respect the cosets of h. That is: we require
that if h(g1) = h(g
′
1), i.e. Kg1 = Kg
′
1, i.e. there is a k ∈ K such that g′1 = kg1, then also
there is a k ∈ K such that a1(g′1) = ka1(g1). But a1 and h need not mesh in this way:
commutation of the diagram is not guaranteed.
The smallest counterexample we have found takes G1 as the dihedral group D4. It has
D2 as a normal subgroup, D2  D4, with D4/D2 ∼= C2 = {0, 1}. So we take G2 as (up
to isomorphism) the cyclic group C2 and h : G1 → G2 as the canonical projection taking
each element of D4 to its D2-coset. Then we define a1 : D4 → D4 to take an element b
of the normal subgroup D2 out of D2. This implies that the diagram cannot commute.
For on the left of the diagram h : D4 3 b 7→ D2 = eD4/D2 , so that any bottom-row
homomorphism a2 must map D2 = eD4/D2 7→ D2 = eD4/D2 ; while on the right of the
diagram h : D4 3 a1(b) 7→ (D2)a1(b) 6= eD4/D2 .
The details are as follows. D4 is the symmetry group of the square, and is generated
by two elements: rotation out of the plane of the square by pi about the axis in the plane
that horizontally bisects the square; and rotation in the plane of the square by pi/2 about
the axis normal to the plane through the centre of the square. We label these b and c
respectively. So with e the identity transformation, b2 = c4 = e. One checks that bc and
bc3 are the rotations out of the plane of the square by pi about the two diagonal axes, and
bc2 is the rotation about the axis in the plane that vertically bisects the square. So these
elements are of order 2. Also one checks that cb = bc3, c2b = bc2, c3b = bc. And so D4 has
eight elements, which we write as {e, c, c2, c3, b, bc, bc2, bc3}, with generating equations b2 =
c4 = (bc)2 = e. D4 has a copy of the dihedral group D2—viz. {e, c2, b, bc2} with generating
equations b2 = (c2)2 = (bc2)2 = e—as a normal subgroup: D2  D4, with D4/D2 ∼= C2.
So define h : D4 → D4/D2 ≡ {D2, D2(bc)} as the canonical projection. That is: each
element of D2 is sent to D2 ∈ D4/D2; and the other four elements, c, c3, bc, bc3, are each
sent to their common coset D2(bc). Finally, we define the automorphism a1 : D4 → D4
as:
(i) the identity map on the rotations in the plane (the powers of c); but also
(ii) mapping b to bc, i.e. b ∈ D2 is mapped out of D2, and
(iii) mapping bc to bc2, bc2 to bc3, and bc3 to bc4 ≡ b (so that an element out of D2
is mapped into D2).
A tedious check shows that a1 thus defined is an automorphism. So by the argument in
the preceding paragraph, the diagram in Figure 4 does not commute.
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